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CONSOLIDATED EDISON AND BELLOTTI:
FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF

CORPORATE POLITICAL SPEECH
Robert A. Prentice*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The value of free political expression to America's society and system of government cannot be doubted. As Judge Learned Hand eloquently wrote, the first amendment "presupposes that right conclusions
are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than
through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all."1
Although criticized by Professor Emerson, America's leading first
amendment theoretician, for failing to exert the initiative and innovation necessary to preserve the values underlying freedom of expression, 2 the Burger Court added the corporate voice to the "multitude of
tongues" participating in American discussion when it established two
major extensions of first amendment protection 3 -to commercial
speech,4 and to corporate political speech. In Central Hudson Gas &
*
Austin,
1.
2.

Assistant Professor of Business Law, Graduate School of Business, University of Texas,
Texas. B.A., University of Kansas, 1972. J.D., Washburn University, 1975.
United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 363, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
Emerson, FirstAmendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALi. L. REv. 422, 423

(1980).
3. Cox, Foreword- Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1, 71

(1980).
4. This paper accepts Professor Farber's theories regarding the definition of "commercial"
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Electric Corp. v. PublicService Commission,' a commercial speech case,
and ConsolidatedEdison Co. v. PublicService Commission,6 a corporate
political speech case, the Supreme Court issued its latest words 7 in both
areas.
That CentralHudsonand ConsolidatedEdisonwere decided on the
same day symbolizes the close relationship between the developments
in commercial speech and corporate political speech. Nonetheless,
while the protection of commercial speech is now well established by a
long line of cases,' generally supported by a strong majority of the
Supreme Court, 9 and generally lauded by the commentators,' 0 the
same cannot be said for the protection of corporate political speech.
This fledgling doctrine is embodied only in ConsolidatedEdison and its
predecessor First NationalBank of Boston v. Bellotti, l I has yet to develop a strong core of majority support on the Supreme Court, 2 and
has received considerable adverse reaction from commentators.' 3 The
corporate political speech doctrine remains in a formative stage, and it
speech, which emphasize the distinction between the informational and contractual aspects of
speech. Farber, Commercial Speech and FirstAmendment 7heory, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 372, 387
(1979). The Farber theory has been summarized as one which would
define commercial speech as expression in which there is a direct functional relationship
or nexus between the message and a later commercial transaction, depending upon such
factors as whether the speech mentions a brand name product or service, whether it is of
interest to a non-diverse consumer audience, whether it proposes a commercial transaction, or whether it discusses the merits or demerits of a particular company, product or
service.
Prettyman and Mincberg, Corporate Speech: Extending the Evolving Doctrine, Legal Times of
Washington, Aug. 11, 1980, at 13, col. 1.
5. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
6. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
7. As this article is written, the Supreme Court has under advisement a case, argued February 25, 1981, which could produce a decision touching upon both commercial and political speech
issues. In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510,
prob.juris,noted 101 S. Ct. 265 (1980), the California Supreme Court, over a strong first amendment-based dissent by Justice Clark, held that a San Diego ordinance banning off-premises billboards was a proper exercise of municipal police powers.
8. See notes 42-45 infra and accompanying text.
9. Only Justice Rehnquist remains a steadfast opponent of first amendment protection for
commercial speech, as is typified by his lone dissent in CentralHudson.
10. But see Baker, Commercial Speech: 4 Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L.
Rnv. 1 (1976); Rembar, For Sale: Freedom of Speech, ATLANrTc MONTHLY, March, 1981, at 28
(critical of "elevating simple moneymaking to the constitutional level of political comment and
artistic expression").
11. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
12. The vote to protect the corporate political speech in Bellotti carried by a slim 5-to-4
margin; the vote in ConsolidatedEdison was 7-to-2. Because Mr. Justice Blackmun was in the
majority in Bellotti but dissented in ConsolidatedEdison, five of the nine Supreme Court Justices
have voted against protection of corporate political speech when given the opportunity.
13. See Cox, supra note 3, at 70; Note, XIII SUFFOLK L. REV. 124, 137 (1979); Note, 1979
UTAH L. REV. 95, 106.
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is conceivable that its future course will be affected by the commentary
of scholars.1"
The Supreme Court's decision to extend first amendment protection to corporate political speech has been subjected to criticism aimed
at both its theoretical underpinnings and its practical implications. The
most thoughtful and detailed criticism of the legal theories underlying
the majority opinion in Bellotti (which is also applicable to Consolidated Edison) is that offered by Professor O'Kelley, who suggests that
Supreme
Bellotti's majority opinion is seriously inconsistent with prior
5
Court decisions regarding corporate constitutional rights.'
Representative of the criticism of the practical effects of protecting
corporate political speech is the comment from Professor Archibald
Cox that the Bellotti decision will "increas[e] the relative influence of
organizations with large financial resources.

. .

shrinking the attention

paid to truly individual voices [resulting in] a net loss of human freedom."16

It is the thesis of this article that the Supreme Court's extension of
first amendment protection to corporate political speech, although not
immune from criticism, is a positive development which should be applauded. After a general discussion of the rights of corporations, this
article will briefly sketch the development of the first amendment protection for commercial and corporate speech. Next, the article will examine with a critical eye the theoretical and practical criticisms that
have been hurled against the decisions establishing first amendment
protection for corporate political speech. Ultimately, the article will
conclude that these criticisms constitute an overreaction to the potential
implications of Bellotti and ConsolidatedEdison and an underappreciation of the beneficial effects of the protection of corporate political
speech.
II.

CORPORATIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION

It is clear that neither the Founding Fathers nor the framers of the
fourteenth amendment had the rights of corporations foremost in their
14. It is apparent that the courts do pay attention to and are influenced by the comments of
legal scholars. Edmunds, Hail to Law Review, 1 J. MAR. J. PRAc. & PRoc. 1, 1-17 (1967); Traynor, To the Right HonorableLaw Review, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 3, 3-10 (1962); Warren, Upon the
Tenth Anniversary ofthe UCLA Law Review, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1962).
15. O'Kelley, The ConstitutionalRights ofCorporationsRevisited: Socialand PoliticalExpression andthe Corporation,4fterFirst National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347 (1979) [hereinaf-

ter cited as O'Kelley].
16. Cox, supra note 3, at 70.
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minds as they carried out their historic functions.' 7 The word "corporation" does not even appear in the Constitution. A scanning of the
courts' treatment of corporate constitutional rights reveals, as might be
expected due to the dearth of guidance given by the Constitution, a
rather spotty development.
The traditional view of corporations is epitomized in an oftenquoted passage from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Dartmouth
College v. Woodward: s
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible,
and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere
creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the
charter of creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed
best calculated to effect the object for which it was created. t9
Consistent with this constricted view of the nature of corporations,
the Supreme Court has denied that corporations are "citizens" for purposes of the privileges and immunities clauses of the Constitution, and
has held that the "liberty" referred to as protected in the fourteenth
amendment is that of natural, not artificial persons.20 Similarly, the
Court has denied corporations the right of privacy2 ' and the privilege
against self-incrimination' which the Constitution accords individuals.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has given corporations
some significant constitutional protections. Most importantly, corporations have been deemed "citizens" protected by the due process clauses
of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, 23 and the latter amendment's
equal protection clause.2' Additionally, corporations have been given
17. It has been said that only twenty-six domestic corporations were in existence at the time
of the framing of the Constitution. I W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2, at 6 (rev. perm. ed. 1974).

Similarly, the debates preceding passage of the fourteenth amendment paid little or no attention to the corporation. i. BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTs 351-52 (Mentor ed. 1965).
18. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
19. Id at 636. Professor Cox has characterized this view as "Jacksonian." Cox, supra note 3,

at 65. That it was also espoused by federalist judges accounts for the view's staying power,
20. Asbury Hosp. v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207, 210-11 (1945); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496,

527 (1939); Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907); Northwestern Life Ins. Co.
v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586-87 (1839).

21. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651-52 (1950).
22. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55 (1974); Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361, 376 (1911).
23. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535-36 (1925); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522
(1898); Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889).
24. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 80-81 (1938); Santa Clara County
v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
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constitutional protection against double jeopardy 25 and unreasonable
searches and seizures.26
The early view of the role of corporations in the American political process was a restrictive one. Chief Justice Marshall, again in the
Dartmouth College case, stated that the corporation "does not share in
the civil government of the country, unless that be the purpose for
which it was created. Its immortality no more confers on it political
power, or a political character, than immortality would confer such
power or character on a natural person. 27
Notwithstanding Chief Justice Marshall's sentiments, corporate
political activity in the United States, which included various forms of
political speech, commenced about the time the Dartmouth College
case was decided. 28 Before another century had passed, corporations
began the effective use of the media to amplify their political speech in
ways we find familiar today.29
Despite the considerable amount of litigation regarding corporate
rights under the Constitution and the long-standing tradition of corporate political speech, when the era of the Burger Court dawned there
was no clear rule that corporate political speech was protected by the
first amendment. The closest the Supreme Court had come to the issue
was its holding in Grosjean v.American Press Co. 3 owhich invalidated a
Louisiana licensing tax on publishers of newspapers. Grosean, however, was not a clear statement on general corporate political speech
rights because its holding was grounded on fourteenth amendment due
process precedents rather than on a separate recognition of free speech
rights of corporations. 3 1 Also, Grosjean involved the rights of a newspaper, a media corporation supposedly more deserving of first amendment protection than an ordinary business corporation.32 This
distinction between most corporations and those involved in the media
25. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977); Rex Trailer Co. v. United

States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956).
26. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311-13 (1978); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United

States, 429 U.S. 338, 353-54 (1977); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906).
27. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
28. See E. EPSTmN,THE CORPORATION IN AMERICAN PoLrIcs 22 (1969) [hereinafter cited

as EPsTIN].
29. Id at 32.

30. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
31. Id at 244.
32. The Grosjean opinion involved lengthy discussions of the history of freedom of the press.

Id at 245-50.
Other cases in the Grosjean mold are cited in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 382-83 (1973).
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(and therefore benefiting from the freedom of the press) remained of

legal significance for years.33
The Grosjean holding was largely overshadowed just three years
later by Justice Stone's concurring opinion in Hague v. C10 34 that corporations do not enjoy freedom of speech.35 Thus, Hague and Grosjean, when read together, indicated that only corporations able to
claim freedom of the press would be accorded freedom of speech.3 6

Although there was no Supreme Court holding supportive and on
point,37 some lower courts in the 1970's did recognize corporate free

speech as protectible.38 More importantly, the Burger era heralded the
extension of first amendment protection to "commercial speech," with
little attention paid to the identity of the speaker, 39 a development
which was destined to pave the way for protection of corporate political
speech.
III.

EVOLUTION OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE

It is customary in discussions of the doctrine of commercial speech
to note that the long-recognized view that such speech was not entitled
to first amendment protection stemmed from a statement in the 1942
33. Rome and Roberts, Bellotti andthe FirstAmendment: A New Era in CorporateSpeech? 3
CoPt. L. REv. 28, 33 (1980).
This distinction explains the limited impact on corporate political speech rights of such cases

as Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (involving "public figure" aspect of good faith
defense in defamation actions); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)

(invalidating "equal space" reply requirement for newspaper as violative of first amendment's
freedom of press clause); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (striking
government's prior restraint against the printing of classified information); and New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (establishing the qualified good faith defense in defamation
cases).
34. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
35. Id at 527.
36. See Note, 39 LA. L. REv. 1225, 1230 n.25 (1979).
37. Despite the lack of direct precedent, a guess was hazarded in Note, 78 HARV. L. Rnv.
1191, 1193 (1965) that union and corporate political speech was protected under the first amendment. The prediction was based on Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127, 136 (1961) (establishing a political activity exception to the Sherman Act's ban on
conspiracy); United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 621-24 (1954) (Supreme Court reversed conviction of agricultural association under Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act by limiting the Act to
direct communications with members of Congress); and United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 12124 (1948) (majority held that Federal Corrupt Practices Act did not apply to union magazine's
endorsement of candidates; four Justices felt the act did apply and, as applied, was unconstitutional).
38. See Fram v. Yellow Cab Co., 380 F. Supp. 1314, 1334 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Borough of
Collingswood v. Ringold, 66 N.J. 350, 331 A.2d 262, 270 (1975).
39. See Tyler and Bateman, Is CorporateSpeech Free Speech?, 12 Bus. L. REv. 15 (1979).
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opinion in Valentine v. Chrestensen4 ° which Justice Douglas later de-

scribed as a "casual, almost offhand" remark.4 1 The demise of the
traditional view commenced with the Burger Court's decision in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations,42 which
intimated that commercial speech might be deserving of first amend-

ment protection, and was completed in the 1976 opinion in Virginia
State Board ofPharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.41

With but two exceptions,'

the Burger Court has invalidated every

commercial speech ban considered since 1973. 45

The single legal development most responsible for recognition of
the protected nature of commercial speech is the rise of the doctrine of
the "right to receive." Noting that "[fireedom to speak would be 46a
the speech did not exist,"

hollow right if a concomitant right to hear

one author has argued that "[t]he right to receive has its origins in the

concept of freedom of communication that the framers of the Constitution sought to embody in the first amendment."'4 7
The right to receive must, and does, find its rationale for first
40. 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
41. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
42. 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973).
43. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
44. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (sustaining ban on potentially misleading use of
trade names by optometrists); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (upholding
regulation of overreaching conduct by attorneys).
45. See Neuborne, A RationaleforProtectingandRegulating CommercialSpeech, 46 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 437, 437 at n.2 (1980), which provides this thumbnail sketch of the pre-Consolidated
Edison commercial speech cases:
The rise of commercial speech as a category of communication entitled to a degree of
first amendment protection may be traced through Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (suggesting a degree of first amendment protection for commercial speech); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298
(1974) (four members of Court suggesting that commercial speech is protected); Bigelow
v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (commercial advertisement of abortion clinic protected);
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976) (price advertising by pharmacists protected); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
Inc., 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (advertising of contraceptives protected); Linmark Assocs., Inc.
v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (for-sale signs on real property protected); and Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (price and service advertising
by lawyers protected).
Id
46. Comment, The Right to Receive andthe CommercialSpeech Doctrine: New Constitutional
Considerations,63 GEo. L.J. 775, 777-78 (1975).
47. Id at 777 n.16, quoting letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1882, in 3
LETTERS AND OTHER WrrNGs OF JAMES MADISON 276 (J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1865):
A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but
a prologue to a farce or tragedy; or, perhaps, both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; and a people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with the
power which knowledge brings.
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amendment protection in service of the goals of freedom of expression.
Professor Emerson has written that freedom of expression is essential:
(1) as a method of assuring the individual of self-fulfillment,
(2) as a means of attaining the truth, (3) as a method of securing participation by the members of the society in social,
including political, decision-making, and (4) as a means of
maintaining
the balance between stability and change in the
48
society.
Alexander Meiklejohn, the other influential modem first amendment theorist, has stressed the crucial role freedom of expression plays
in American self-government, stating "[tihe principle of freedom of
speech springs from the necessities of the program of self-government. . . . It is a deduction from the basic American49 agreement that
public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage.
In recent years, the right to receive messages has been increasingly
recognized as integral to the values mentioned by both Emerson and
Meiklejohn, and therefore deserving of elevation to a status of full constitutional protection. The Supreme Court's first recognition of the
right to receive appeared in Martin v. Struthers,5" in which the Court
reversed the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness who had violated an
ordinance prohibiting the ringing of doorbells for the purpose of handing out leaflets. In so doing, the Court recognized the right of willing
listeners to receive defendant's handbills, as well as the defendant's
right to distribute them."' Later, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 2
the Court interpreted the first amendment to protect the "right to
know" as well as the "right to speak.15 3 The initial clear recognition of
a right to receive, existing independently of the right to speak, occurred
in Kleindienst v. Mandel,54 although the decision denied relief to a foreign Marxist who sought to enter this country to give a speech.
Full recognition of the right to receive arrived, not coincidentally,
with full recognition of the first amendment's protection of commercial
speech in the VirginiaPharmacy case, which involved an attack on Virginia's prohibition of price advertising by licensed pharmacists. Plaintiffs in the action were not pharmacists wishing to advertise, but
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

T. EMERSON, TowARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (1966).
A. MEanLa oI-, POLITICAL EXPREssION 27 (1965).
319 U.S. 141 (1943).
Id at 148-49.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id at 269-70.
408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972).
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consumers seeking price information due to the documented phenomenon of price differentials from store to store of up to 650% for a particular drug.55
Speaking for the majority, Justice Blackmun commenced with a
brief history of the right to receive, noting that free speech is afforded
"to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both, '56 and
concluding: "If there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right57to
receive the advertising, and it may be asserted by these appellees.
Turning to the question of whether commercial speech deserved
first amendment protection, Justice Blackmun felt that in Bigelow v.
Virginia,58 an opinion striking down a state's attempt to ban circulation
of abortion information, the Valentine v. Chrestensen "notion of unprotected 'commercial speech' all but passed from the scene." 59 Framing
the issue presented as whether commercial speech was "so removed
from any exposition of 'ideas' ",60 that it lacked first amendment protection, Justice Blackmun concluded for the majority that it was not.61
The critical role that the right to receive information played in this conclusion is highlighted in this passage:
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be
made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a
matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate,
be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of
commercial information is indispensable.. . . And if it is in-

dispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the formulation of
intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered. Therefore, even if the First Amendment
were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public decisioumaking in a democracy, we could not say that the
free flow of information does not serve that goal.62
No significant alteration of the commercial speech doctrine of Virginia Pharmacy occurred until CentralHudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
55. 425 U.S. at 754.
56. Id at 756.

57. Id at 757.
58. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).

59. 425 U.S. at 759.
60. Id at 762 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).

61. Id
62. Id at 765 (citations omitted).
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Public Service Commission,63 in which a regulated electric utility challenged a state regulatory commission's ban on promotional advertising.
Reaffirming that the constitutional protection for commercial speech
springs from the "informational function of advertising," 6 Justice
Powell's majority opinion again stressed the role of the right to receive:
Commercial expression not only serves the economic interest
of the speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of information. In applying the First Amendment to this area, we have
rejected the "highly paternalistic" view that government has
complete power to suppress or regulate commercial speech.
"[Pleople will perceive their own best interests if only they are
well enough informed, and.

. .

the best means to that end is

to open the channels of communication rather than to close
them...

."

Even when advertising communicates only an

incomplete version of the relevant facts, the First Amendment
presumes that some accurate information is better than no information at all.65

Surveying the Court's past commercial speech opinions, Justice
Powell discovered a four-part test for determining the status under the
first amendment of particular commercial communications:
[1] At the outset, we must determine whether the expression
is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech
to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we must ask
[2] whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.
If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine
[3] whether the regulation directly advances the government
interest asserted, and [4] whether it is not more extensive than
is necessary to serve that interest.66
Justice Powell had little difficulty applying the criteria to the facts
at hand. The defendant commission did not claim that the banned
speech was either false or related to illegal activity, and Justice Powell
found the information conveyed worthy of protection, despite plaintiff's monopoly position, because it would aid consumers in choosing
among electricity and its energy substitutes such as fuel oil and natural
63. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).

64. Id at 563.
65. Id at 561-62 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976), and citing Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 92 (1977); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977)).
66. Id at 566 (bracketed numbers added).
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67

Although Justice Powell found that the state interests involvedenergy conservation and prevention of advertising's aggravation of the
inequities caused by the failure to base the utility's rates on marginal
cost-were "clear and substantial," 68 he determined that the latter interest was not directly promoted by the advertising ban69 and that the
former interest could be met in a more limited fashion.
With some justification, Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent that the
majority's application of its four-part test would make it "quite diffi71
cult" 70 for a legislature to draft rules which would satisfy the test,

and, consequently, he complained that the majority's test "thus elevates
the protection accorded commercial speech that falls within the scope
is virtually indistinguishable
of the First Amendment to a level that
72
from that of noncommercial speech."
Because CentralHudson continued to key the protected status of
commercial speech to the consumer's need for information, 73 a survey
of the Supreme Court's commercial speech cases indicates that the most
important factor in the analysis is whether the reason for the proposed
ban is that the speech might be false and misleading. If that is the true
justification for the regulation or prohibition, there is no listener interest to support such a false communication, and it will be considered
unprotected by the first amendment.74
If, on the other hand, the reason for the attempt to limit commercial expression rests on state interests other than preventing false
speech or illegal activity, those reasons must be compelling. The Burger Court has yet to find a sufficient rationale for such regulation other
than preventing untruth and illegality, although it has not formally announced that commercial speech is deserving of the same level of protection as political speech.75
67. Id at 566-67.
68. Id at 569.

69. Id at 569-70.
70. id at 595.
71. At least one author has agreed with Justice Rehnquist, arguing that a state legislature, to
meet the majority's test, would be required to undertake incredibly complicated economic studies
measuring the correlation between consumer demand and advertising, isolating all other potential
Key Plugfrom Brethren, Nat'l
factors affecting peak demand. See Fein, Free Speech in Ads fins
L.J., Nov. 17, 1980, at 15, col. 1.

72.
73.
74.
LYN L.
75.

447 U.S. at 591.
Id at 567.
See Neuborne, A RationaleforProtectingandRegulatingCommercialSpeech, 46 BROOKREv.437, 439 (1980).
A number of potential grounds for distinguishing between commercial and political
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When one surveys the interests served by free expression, such as

those listed above by Emerson and Meiklejoim, it appears that only
self-expression is not served by the protection of commercial speech,
and an argument can be made that even that interest is furthered in
some instances.76

Thus, as long as Centra/Hudsonremains representative of the majority thinking of the Supreme Court, commercial speech will continue

to receive a very high degree of first amendment protection. Where
such speech is not false or inciteful of illegal activity, its informational
value to recipients will be held to outweigh even plainly substantial
state interests served by a speech ban, unless that ban directly serves
the interest and is scrupulously circumscribed. 7
Although the right to receive doctrine has reached its fullest flower

in the commercial speech area, it has also provided the basis for the
Supreme Court's extention of first amendment protection to political
speech by corporations.
IV.

THE BELLo77"I LANDMARK

The first unmistakable Supreme Court recognition of corporate

political speech as a protected form of expression came in FirstNational
Bank ofBoston v. Bellotti. 78 At issue was the constitutionality of a state
criminal statute which prohibited expenditures by banks and business
corporations for the purpose of influencing the vote on state referen-

dum proposals not "materially affecting" any of the property, business
or assets of the corporation. The Supreme Judicial Council of Massa-

chusetts had sustained the law against the challenge of several corporaspeech remain, such as claims by some of the Justices that commercial advertising is more susceptible to empirical verification than is political speech, and that the profit motive behind commercial speech renders it less susceptible than political speech to the chilling effects of government
regulation. For a complete discussion of these arguments, see Note, FirstAmendment Protection
for Commercial Advertising: The New ConstitutionalDoctrine, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 205, 222-25
(1976).
76. The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. Rlv. 74, 164-65 (1980).
77. For other helpful discussion of the commercial speech doctrine, see Emerson, The First
Amendment andthe Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1; Farber, ContentRegulation and the First
Amendment: 4 Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727, 758-60 (1980); Jackson and Jeffries, CommercialSpeech, Economic DueProcessandtheFirstAmendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1 (1979); Meiklejohn,
CommercialSpeech and the FirstAmendment, 13 CALIF. W.L. REv. 430 (1977); Rollinson and
Oshoway, The Businessman and CommercialSpeec&" How Much Protection?2 CoRP. L. REv. 275
(1979); Comment, Regulating CommercialSpeeckr A ConceptualFrameworkfor,4nalysis,32 BAYLOR L. Rnv. 235 (1980); Comment, PriorRestraintsand Restrictionson Advertising After Virginia
Pharmacy Board: The Commercial Speech Doctrine Reformulated, 43 Mo. L. REv. 64 (1978);
Note, The ConstitutionalStatus of CommercialExpression,3 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 761 (1976).
78. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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tions wishing to present their views on a state income tax referendum.
The court held that corporate speech rights were not coextensive with
those enjoyed by natural persons, but were limited to situations where
"a general political issue materialy affects a corporation's business,
property or assets. 79
This ban on corporate political speech"0 did not fare as well at the
hands of a slim majority of the Supreme Court whose views were announced by Justice Powell. The Court began by stating that the Massachusetts court had asked the wrong question when it focused on the
extent of corporate rights. 8 ' Justice Powell characterized the issue as a
first amendment, rather than a corporate law question. Noting that
some first amendment cases implicate more rights than just those of the
speaker, Justice Powell stated that the proper question was whether the
Massachusetts law "abridges expression that the First Amendment was
meant to protect. '82 The majority of the Court felt that it did.
Justice Powell initially noted that the speech which the plaintiffs
sought to undertake was "at the heart of First Amendment protection."8 3 Stating that our system of free expression serves not just the
interest of self-expression, but also that of self-government, 84 the opinion established a theoretical basis for protecting corporate political
speech which parallels the right to receive theory underlying the protection of commercial speech. Because the message itself deserves first
amendment protection, Justice Powell wrote, its source was irrelevant
to the analysis:
If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that the State could silence their proposed speech. It is
the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes
79. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Attorney Gen., 359 N.E.2d 1262, 1269-70 (Mass. 1977)
(emphasis added). The state court's holding was arguably consistent with the major nineteenth

century Supreme Court opinions which established the basic outlines of corporate constitutional
rights. See Comment, XIII SUFFOLK L. REV. 124, 129 (1979).

80. That political expenditures and contributions can constitute political speech is established
in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19, 39 (1976), which fully protected independent expenditures but
not candidate campaign contributions because the latter have little communicative value because
they are simply turned over to the candidate; and raise a greater danger of actual or apparent

corruption.
81. 435 U.S. at 775-76.
82. Id at 776.
83. Id
84. Id at 777 n.12. This recognition of the value of corporate political speech to the concept
of self-government has been hailed as "the final and complete triumph for the Meiklejobn conception of the First Amendment." Rome and Roberts, Bellotti andthe FirstAmendment: A New Era
in CorporateSpeech? 3 CoR'. L. REv. 28, 38 (1980).
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from a corporation rather than an individual. The inherent
worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the
public does not depend upon the identity of its source,
whether corporation, association, union, or individual.8
Disdaining the lower court's examination of corporate due process
rights and its conclusion that corporate free speech must be limited to
matters "materially affecting" a corporation's business, Justice Powell
stated that the Supreme Court's prior decisions implicitly recognizing
corporate speech rights had never been based directly upon the fact
that the corporations involved were media corporations.86 Justice Powell explicitly recognized the importance of the evolution of the commercial speech doctrine to the present issue, noting:
Nor do our recent commercial speech cases lend support
to appellee's business interest theory. They illustrate that the
First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the
self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from
limiting the stock of information from which members of the
public may draw. A commercial advertisement is constitutionally protected not so much because it pertains to the
seller's business as because it furthers the societal interest in
the "free flow of commercial information."87
Placing the burden on the government to show a "compelling" interest which would justify the suppression of the speech involved,88 the
Court, in effect, applied the traditional first amendment standard of
review 89 as developed and applied in earlier cases such as NAACP v.
Button,9" Elrod v. Burns,91 and Buckley v. Valeo,9 2 in the context of
corporate political speech. Justice Powell examined Massachusetts'
proffered justifications for the ban on corporate political spending(1) preservation of the role of individuals in the electoral process, and
(2) protection of minority shareholders who might disagree with the
85. 435 U.S. at 777 (footnotes omitted).
86. Id at 781-83. Thus, Justice Powell discarded in rather summary fashion the long-recog-

nized distinction between first amendment rights given those corporations which could claim freedom of the press and those accorded non-media corporations which could not. The distinction, of
course, dated from the Gronean case. See Rome and Roberts, supra note 84, at 33 (1980).

87. Id at 783 (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977)).

88. Id at 786.
89. See Note, 20 B.C. L. REv. 1003, 1006 (1979).

90. 371 U.S. 516 (1960).
91. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
92. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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corporate position 9 -and found them wanting. Justice Powell found
the record insufficient to support the assumption that corporate political participation in the referendum would exert any undue influence
overshadowing the individual voice, 94 adding "the fact that advocacy
may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it."95
Regarding the protection of minority shareholders, Justice Powell
found the statute invalid as both underinclusive (because corporations
were banned only from spending in referenda elections, not from any
other type of political activity such as lobbying) and overinclusive (because the law would prohibit even corporate expenditures unanimously
authorized by shareholders, and because dissenting shareholders had
other remedies such as derivative suits).96 Additionally, Justice Powell
found no direct relationship
between the protection of minority share97
holders and the ban itself.
Chief Justice Burger wrote a concurring opinion to emphasize the
adverse consequences a contrary decision would have upon the rights
of media corporations. Stating that "no factual distinction has been
identified as yet that would justify government restraints on the right of
appellants to express their views without, at the same time, opening the
door to similar restraints on media conglomerates with their vastly
greater influence,"9 " the Chief Justice stressed the close relationship between freedom of speech and freedom of the press,9 9 concluding:
Because the First Amendment was meant to guarantee
freedom to express and communicate ideas, I can see no difference between the right of those who seek to disseminate
ideas by way of a newspaper and those who give lectures or
speeches and seek to enlarge the audience by publication and
wide dissemination. "[T]he purpose of the Constitution was
not to erect the press into a privileged institution but to protect all persons in their right to print what they will as well as
93. The relative merits and demerits of these justifications are discussed in detail at notes 233
to 277 infra and accompanying text.

94. 435 U.S. at 789.
95. Id at 790. This sentiment reflects the normal American reaction to successful political

activity. For instance, the National Rifle Association is widely recognized as the nation's most
effective lobby, preventing the passage of any effective national handgun control legislation despite significant public support for such proposals. Weber, The NationalRfle 4ssociation: Public
Enemy No. 2, 91 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 958 (Oct. 16, 1974). Yet, opponents of the NRA speak of
how to best it in a fair battle, not of how to silence the NRA's voice.
96. 435 U.S. at 793-94.
97. Id at 794.
98. Id at 797.
99. Id at 799.
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to utter it. '. . . the liberty of the press is no greater and no
less . . .' than the liberty of every citizen of the Repub-

lic.".
In short, the First Amendment does not "belong" to any
definable category of persons or entities. It belongs to all who
exercise its freedom.'
Justice White filed a lengthy dissent which was joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall. Justice White disagreed with the majority's rejection of the two interests supposedly underlying the law in question.
Justice White felt the record did contain evidence indicating corporate
domination of the electoral process, and expressed concern about the
implications of the majority's holding for state and federal corrupt
practices legislation which limits corporate participation in the electoral
process.' 0 He also argued that minority shareholders should not be
forced to subsidize political statements with which they disagree, 02 relying upon holdings in two cases involving employees, Abood v.Detroit
Board ofEducation,I3 and Machinists v. Street.1 4

In his dissent, Justice White made three major arguments. First,
he argued that corporate speech is not as deserving of protection as
individual speech because it does not serve the interest of self-expression. 105 Next, Justice White stressed that because corporations are created by the State and granted special privileges they should be subject
to state regulation, even as to such sensitive matters as freedom of expression. 10 Finally, Justice White castigated the majority for substituting its judgment for that of the Massachusetts legislature regarding the
100. Id at 802 (quoting Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 364 (Frankfurter, J.,concur-

ring)).
101. Id at 810-11, 820-21.
102. Id at 812-18.
103. 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (State may not require individual to contribute to the support of an
ideological cause as a condition of employment).
104. 367 U.S. 740 (1961) (Railway Labor Act construed to prohibit use of compulsory union
dues for political purposes).
105. 435 U.S. at 807. Justice White supported this argument with two claims: (a) that ideas
which are not a product of individual choice are not entitled to protection, and (b) restrictions on
corporate speech do not impinge severely upon the general availability of ideas because individuals, including corporate shareholders, employees and customers can still express their own views.
Justice White did not seem to recognize the value of the right to receive information generated by
a corporation outside the realm of commercial ideas and, thus, would accord much more protection to corporate commercial speech than to corporate political speech. I
106. Id at 809. In response to the special privileges argument, it has been noted that "business corporations pay substantial amounts in corporate income taxes, various special privilege
taxes, and all normal taxes, sales and property, as a condition of this legal existence." Smith,
Business, Bucks & Bull- The Corporation,The FirstAmendment & The CorruptPracticesLaw, 4
DEL.J. CoRP. L. 39, 112 (1978).
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proper balance to be struck among the competing interests involved.1 0 7

Justice Relmquist filed a separate dissent in Belloti, stressing that
corporations, as artificial entities created by the state, enjoy only the
rights necessary to protect their property. In the eyes of Justice Rehnquist, this meant that corporations are entitled to commercial, but not
political speech.'0 8

Although Bellotti has been accurately hailed as a victory for corporate freedom of speech, 0 9 it did not give corporations a true "carte

blanche" in the political speech arena." 0 The majority expressly declined to decide whether corporations enjoy the full speech rights
which are accorded individuals,"' or whether, under other circum-

stances, regulation of corporate speech might be2 justified, although regulation of an individual's speech would not."

The primary reason Bellotti cannot be viewed as an unqualified
establishment of corporate political speech is the majority's refusal to

recognize a cognizable first amendment interest residing in the corporation as speaker." 3 Rather, as noted above, protection of corporate
political speech has been based upon the listener's right to receive, fol-

lowing the pattern of the commercial speech area." 4 Thus, the corporate political message in Bellotti was deemed protected only because it

provided a message valuable to society's search for truth and facilitated
our system of self-government."

5

That the interest of self-expression is probably not served by most
corporate political speech could, in some future case, serve to differenti107. Id at 804. Of course, if the legislature were always given discretion to strike a proper
balance between competing interests, the first amendment would be gutted. History is replete with
examples of governmental insensitivity and even hostility to freedom of expression. The Supreme
Court cannot abdicate its duty to review such judgments. Generally, the Court has declared that
"[d]eference to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are
at stake." Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978).
108. 435 U.S. at 822-28.
109. H. SCHMERTZ, CORPORATIONs AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6 (1978). Mr. Schmertz
has been the driving force behind Mobil Corporation's many public relations offensives, including
the "op Ed" columns which appear regularly in many influential newspapers.
110. Note, 48 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 96, 107 (1979).
111. 435 U.S. at 777.
112. Id at 777-78 n.13. Justice Rehnquist's dissent justifiably complained that the majority
did not explain why such a distinction remained. Id at 823 n.l.
113. Neuborne, .4 RationaleforProtectingand Regulating CommercialSpeech, 46 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 437, 458 (1980).
114. Rome and Roberts, Bellotti and the FirstAmendment: A New Era in CorporateSpeech? 3
Cop. L. REv. 28, 38 (1979); Note, 20 B.C. L. REv. 1003, 1017 (1979).
115. See Note, supra note 110, at 99.
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ate between treatment of corporate and individual speech. 16 Further,
because the basic Burger Court approach to first amendment problems
is that of balancing," 7 the corporate nature of the speaker can provide
a government interested in prohibiting corporate speech with arguments to use on its side that would not be present if the speaker were an
individual. Bellotti addressed two purported interests of this nature
and found both wanting as bases for suppression of the corporate political speech in question. However, neither ground was unqualifiedly rejected. The potential problem of undue influence stemming from the
corporate nature of the speaker was rejected as unsupported in the record."" The majority opinion clearly indicated that if such findings persuasively appeared in a later record, the groundwork might well be laid
for a different result.' 'I Similarly, the Court did not say that protection
of minority shareholders could never be the basis for a ban on corporate political speech; rather, the Court held that this particular ban was0
underinclusive, overinclusive, and not directly related to such a goal.12
The tenor of the Bellotai opinion, however, did indicate that such
justifications would be closely scrutinized whenever a government attempted to stifle corporate political speech. This was confirmed by the
ruling in the other corporate political speech case which has come
before the Supreme Court.
V. THE NEXT STEP: CONSOLIDATED EDISON
The second and most recent application of the Burger Court's
views on corporate political speech occurred in ConsolidatedEdison Co.
v. Public Service Commission,' 2' which involved an electric utility's
challenge to a New York regulatory commission's order prohibiting the
mailing by public utilities of bill inserts discussing controversial issues
of public policy, especially the desirability of nuclear energy. As did
of corporate politBellotti, ConsolidatedEdison addressed a question
22
ical speech, rather than commercial speech.'
116. Justice White's Bellotti dissent pointed out that the holding of Buckley v. valeo, 424 U.S.
1 (1976) that individual campaign expenditures constituted protected speech was largely based
upon the ground that such expenditures allowed an individual to speak his mind. Justice White
argued that this rationale would not apply to a corporate speaker. 435 U.S. at 806 n.6.
117. See Emerson, FirstAmendment Doctrineand the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 422,
457 (1980).
118. 435 U.s. at 789.
119. Id at 788 n.26.
120. Id at 792-95.
121. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
122. The characterization of the speech in ConsolidatedEdison as "political' accepts Professor
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Justice Powell again delivered the majority opinion, which commenced with a reference to Beioti, indicating that first amendment

protection of corporate political speech continued to be conditioned
upon the hearer's right to receive rather than23any right to speak residing independently in the corporate speaker.1
After stressing the value of free speech to the search for truth and
the creation of a "more capable citizenry and more perfect polity,"' 124

Justice Powell, responding to the justifications for the insert ban proffered by the commission, set up a three-part test for determining the

validity of the ban: "We must determine whether the prohibition is
(i) a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction, (ii) a permissible

(iii) a narrowly tailored means of serving
subject-matter regulation, or' 25
a compelling state interest."'
The notion that this ban could be considered a reasonable time,

place or manner restriction was quickly rejected because a basic element of such a restriction is that it not be based upon the content or

subject matter of the proposed speech.' 26 Such was not the case here,
as the commission had "undertaken to suppress certain bill inserts precisely because they address controversial issues of public policy."' 2 7
The Court easily dismissed the comnmission's argument that the inFarber's distinction between the informational and contractual aspects of speech potentially characterized as "commercial." See note 4 supra. The characterization has been questioned in this
case because the speech was economically motivated. Schwarz and Straus, Uneasy Spectre Raised
by CorporateSpeech Rulings, Legal Times of Wash., Aug. 11, 1980, at 15, col. 3.
But Professor Farber has a strong answer to any approach which defines commercial speech
on the basis of economic motivation:
Suppose that a company publishes an exhaustive and entirely truthful survey of the
products of its industry. To make the point clear, assume that the survey was taken by
ConsumerReports and enjoyed constitutional protection when it was published in that
magazine. Distribution by the company could strip the survey of its constitutional protection only if profit motivation were a disqualifying factor. The Virginia Board Court
was clearly correct in rejecting this approach. Economic motivation could not be made a
disqualifying factor without enormous damage to the first amendment. Little purpose
would be served by a first amendment which failed to protect newspapers, paid public
speakers, political candidates with partially economic motives, and professional authors.
Furthermore, the economically motivated speaker is often the most likely to raise the
important issues, since disinterestedness is less common than apathy.
Farber, Commercial Speech and FirstAmendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. Rav. 372, 3 82-83 (1979).
See also Schaefer, The FirstAmendment, Media Conglomeratesand "Business" Corporations: Can
CorporationsSafely Involve Themselves in the PoliticalProcess?55 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 1, 39 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Schaefer]; Note, 43 Mo. L. REv. 64, 72 (1978).
123. 447 U.S. at 533-34.
124. Id at 534 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971)).
125. Id at 535.
126. Id at 536, relying on Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 470 (1980), and Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975).
127. Id at 537.
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sert ban represented a permissible subject matter restraint in that it ap-

plied to all discussion of nuclear power, not just to the expression of a
certain point of view. Noting that free speech means "governments
must not be allowed to choose 'which issues are worth discussing or
debating,' "128 the Court was unable to locate any precedent for a subject matter restriction of this type. 129
Finally, the Court held the insert ban not to be a precisely-drawn
means of serving a compelling state interest, as Belloti required for a
valid prohibition of corporate political speech. The commission advanced three proposed interests to support the ban. First, the commission claimed the ban was necessary to prevent Consolidated Edison
from forcing its views on a captive audience. Stating that where a single speaker and several listeners are involved, "the First Amendment
does not permit the government to prohibit speech as intrusive unless
the 'captive' audience cannot avoid objectionable speech,"'

3 1 the

Court

said that the recipients of Consolidated Edison's message could "escape
exposure to objectionable material simply by transferring the bill insert

13 1
from envelope to wastebasket."'

128. Id at 538 (quoting Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)).
129. The Court admitted that subject matter regulations had been approved in limited circumstances in two cases relied on by the lower court, Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (federal
government allowed to prohibit partisan political speech on military base), and Lehman v. Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (city transit system renting space for commercial advertisements did
not have to rent space for political ads), but limited these two cases to their facts, characterizing
them as cases that rest "on the special interest of a government in overseeing the use of its property." 447 U.S. at 539-40.
130. Id at 541-42.
131. Id at 542. This answer seems a bit glib. It has been argued that:
The consumer will have considerable difficulty ignoring the political materials when he
opens his bills. The billing insert often contains useful information interspersed with the
political materials (regarding rate increases, new company telephone numbers, and energy conservation tips), which increases the likelihood that the customer will peruse the
contents of the billing envelope and see the unwanted political disclosures.
Note, Regulating the Use f PoliticalInsertsin Utility Bills, 64 VA. L. REv. 921, 928 (1978).
The ConsolidatedEdison opinion did not undertake to reconcile a number of cases in this
area which at first blush seem inconsistent. Compare Rowan v. Post Office Dept, 397 U.S. 728,
736-37 (1970) ("mailer's right to communicate must stop at the mailbox of an unreceptive addressee") with Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1943) (municipality cannot ban door-todoor solicitors because they may invade the privacy of households), and Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975) (people driving by outdoor movie screen showing obscene film can avert eyes) with FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978) (to say
one may avoid indecent radio broadcast by turning it off "is like saying that the remedy for an
assault is to run away after the first blow").
However, in footnote 11, the Court suggested that the state could possibly achieve its goal by
simply requiring Consolidated Edison to stop sending bill inserts to the homes of customers who
objected. This is consistent with the remedy in Rowan . Post Office Dept and a preferable approach because it allows the homeowner to decide whether the message is offensive, rather than
having that decision made by the government. See H & L Messengers v. City of Brentwood, 577
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The commission's second proposed compelling state interest was
based upon the argument that because a billing envelope can accommodate only a certain amount of information, a corporation's political
message should not be allowed to crowd out other inserts that promote
energy conservation, safety, and the like. The Court rejected this analogy to broadcasting's RedLion doctrine,1 31 holding that (a) billing envelopes are not a limited public resource comparable to the broadcast
inserts
spectrum, and (b) no evidence in the record indicated that the133
messages.
other
of
sending
the
precluded
at issue had actually
The third supposedly compelling interest, that the ban prevented
ratepayers from subsidizing the costs of policy-oriented bill inserts, was
also quickly rejected on the simple ground that the commission had not
based the ban on an inability to fairly allocate costs between Consoliban applied
dated Edison's shareholders and the ratepayers; rather, the
13 4
even when the shareholders paid all costs of the inserts.
Justice Marshall wrote a brief concurring opinion solely to emphasize that the majority opinion did not address the question whether the
base,
commission could exclude the costs of bill inserts from the rate
35
allocation.1
an
such
of
appropriateness
the
on
nor state a view
Justice Stevens also penned a brief concurring opinion which offered a very simple basis for the majority's result, based upon the commission's motivation: "A regulation of speech that is motivated by
nothing more than a desire to curtail expression of a particular point of
view on controversial issues of general interest is the purest example of
a 'law. . .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.' 136 Justice Stevens felt that the commission's only basis for the ban was that
the messages might be "offensive" to the recipients, and believed it beyond a doubt that "the offensive character of an idea" cannot justify
S.W.2d 444, 451 (Tenn. 1979); Comment, 9 MEM. ST. U.L. REV.661, 667 (1979); Note, 44 ALB. L.
REV. 515, 518 (1980).
132. Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (holding that the regulation of television and radio broadcast frequencies permits the FCC to exercise unusual authority over speech).
133. 447 U.S. at 543.
134. Id Although the Supreme Court disposed of the ratepayer subsidy argument in only a
paragraph, a post-Belloti commentator had considered it sufficiently significant to use as a basis

for the prediction that "it is likely that the imposition of an absolute ban on political inserts in
utility bills ultimately will survive a constitutional challenge." Note, Regulating the Use of PoliticalInserts in Utility Bills, 64 VA. L. REv. 921, 936-37 (1978).
135. 447 U.S. at 544. In a later decision involving another New York public utility company,
Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 51 N.Y.2d 823, 825 (N.Y. App. 1980), the

court upheld the commission's ruling that ratepayers need not foot the bill for all of a utility's
informational advertising.

136. 447 U.S. at 546.
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censorship.'

37

Justice Blackmun, author of the majority opinions in some of the
major commercial speech cases,' 3 ' filed a dissent which was somewhat
less vigorous than Justice White's Bellotti dissent.' 39 The essence of
Blackmun's argument was the conclusion that the bill insert practice
constituted "forced subsidization" by ratepayers of the utility's speech,
even though there was no extra cost to the ratepayers, as surely as if
there had been a state law requiring a person to permit the utility to
include its inserts in that person's private letters.14 0 The prevention of
this subsidy to the state-created monopoly,' the dissent argued, was a
legitimate state interest. 142
In summary, ConsolidatedEdison demonstrates that Bellott! was
not an aberration; rather, the Burger Court seems, at this early stage of
development, to be committed to protecting corporate political speech.
However, the same caveats that applied to Belloa also apply to ConsolidatedEdison. The majority opinion did not recognize a right to political speech residing in the corporate speaker, but continued to base
protection of such speech upon the rights of the receiver. Nor did the
Court hold that a government could never provide a compelling state
interest to override the advantages of free corporate political speech,
137. Id at 548.

138. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); and Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S.
350 (1977).
139. Justice Rehnquist joined in the greater part of Justice Blackmun's dissent. 447 U.S. at
583.
140. Id at 552-53.
141. Although the dissent gave significant weight to the monopoly status which the state had
accorded Consolidated Edison, the majority disposed of the point in a brief footnote which cited
several commercial speech cases for the proposition that the Court had "recognized that the
speech of heavily regulated businesses may enjoy constitutional protection." Id at 534 n. 1. See
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Friedman v.
Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
142. The dissenting opinion states:
Consolidated Edison is completely free to use the mails or any other medium of communication on the same basis as any other speaker. The order merely prevents the utility
from relying on a forced subsidy from the ratepayers. This leads me to conclude that the
State's attempt here to protect the ratepayers from unwillingly financing the utility's
speech and to preserve the billing envelopes for the sole benefit of the customers who pay
for it does not infringe upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the utility.
447 U.S. at 555 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Thus, even the dissent seems to have recognized substantial freedom for corporate political
speech, although it argued that the Court was giving insufficient attention to the ratepayer subsidy
argument in this particular case.
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although three more proffered interests were addressed and rejected as
inadequate under the circumstances.
VI.

ASSESSMENT OF CRITICISM

In a country where it is generally accepted that every individual
should have freedom of political speech, the Supreme Court's decision
to extend similar rights to corporations has been greeted with an unusual amount of criticism. The remainder of this article will address and
attempt to allay the fears expressed regarding the potential implications
of Bellotti and ConsolidatedEdison.

First, the attack upon the theoretical basis of Bellotti and Consolidated Edison lodged by Professor O'Kelley will be examined. Then,
attention will be turned to the adverse practical effects many fear will
stem from these decisions. Two of these effects-the forced subsidization of corporate political speech by minority shareholders who disagree with the corporate message* and the potential for corporate
domination of political speech-were rejected in Bellotti. But the qualified nature of the Bellotti rejection and the fact that such arguments
are applicable in almost any corporate speech case assure that they will
be raised again.143 The problem of corporate domination of political
speech has been especially worrisome to commentators, particularly
where the electoral process is concerned. Therefore, special attention
will be paid to the true dimensions of the problem and the avenues of
approach left open by Bellotti and ConsolidatedEdison.
A.

TheoreticalApproach

The most elaborate and thoughtful criticism of the theoretical underpinnings of the Supreme Court's extension of first amendment protection to corporate political speech is that offered by Professor
O'Kelley. 1 4 O'Kelley views the Bellotti decision, and presumably ConsolidatedEdison as well, 145 as inconsistent with prior Supreme Court
case law in the area of corporate constitutional rights. Because acceptance of Professor O'Kelley's theories would have dramatic repercus143. In contrast, the arguments supporting the speech ban at issue in ConsolidatedEdison
arose out of a somewhat unique factual setting and do not have the same general application.
144. See O'Kelley, supra note 15, at 1368-74.
145. O'Kelley's article concerns itself primarily with the 'ellotii decision and predates the
ConsolidatedEdison opinion. Although the discussion of O'Kelley's theories will include only

Belloid, it appears that his views of ConsolidatedEdison would be generally the same.
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sions adversely affecting the availability of the corporate political
message, his views should be carefully examined.
O'Kelley's basic thesis is that "[e]xpression is possible only by natural persons, not by corporations."' 46 O'Kelley believes that Bellotti
47
foolishly ascribes the ability to speak to the artificial corporate entity. 1
48
This error, says O'Kelley, constitutes a "category-mistake"
which the
Supreme Court has not made before. Rather, O'Kelley finds in such
early Supreme Court cases as Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacfic
Railroad,149 Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway v. Beckwith,"' Hale v.
Henkel,1 5 1 and Northwestern Life Insurance Co. v. Riggs "5' 2 a consistent

theoretical approach, which he denominates the "Field rationale."1 5 3
The Field rationale has two aspects. First, it provides that the constitutional rights of a corporation must be "coextensive with the rights
that its shareholders would enjoy if they had chosen to conduct their
business in an unincorporated form."1 14 Second, it recognizes that
"only natural persons can assert natural liberties, as opposed to rights
'55
necessary to protect property."'
Although the Field rationale is an interesting theoretical concept,
it is a device of Professor O'Kelley's construction, not a theory actually
enunciated and applied by the Supreme Court.' 56 Indeed, the theory is
constructed from a few isolated statements made by Justice Field, 5 7
146. O'Kelley, supra note 15, at 1351.
147. Id at 1370.

148. A "category-mistake" "represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of types or categories) when they actually belong to another." Id at
1350 (quoting G. RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF THE MIND 16 (1949)).

149. 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (corporations entitled to equal protection under the fourteenth
amendment).

150. 129 U.S. 26 (1889) (corporations entitled to due process under the fourteenth amendment).

151. 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (corporations are not entitled to privilege against self-incrimination of

fifth amendment, but indicating in dicta that corporations are entitled to fourth amendment's
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures).

152. 203 U.S. 243 (1906) (the "liberty" referred to in the fourteenth amendment is reserved for

natural, not artificial, persons).
153. Id at 1356. The term "Field rationale" is derived from key opinions penned by Mr.

Justice Field in his capacity as a Circuit Judge-the lower court opinion in the Santa Clara
County case, reported at 18 F. 385 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883), and its predecessor County of San Mateo v.
Southern Pac. R.R., 13 F. 722 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882), writ oferrordismissedperapplicationofcounsel,
116 U.S. 138 (1885).
154. O'Kelley, supra note 15, at 1356.
155. Id
156. Even O'Keiley characterizes the Field rationale as "unelucidated." Id at 1351.

157. The statement most directly supportive of the Field rationale is the following from
County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R.R., 18 F. 385, 403 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883):
Whatever affects the property of the corporation-that is, of all the members united by
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sitting as a Circuit Judge, and an assumption that these statements

as the
made in lower court opinions were accepted (usually silently)
158
rationale for later Supreme Court cases on the same subject.

Further, O'Kelley's claims of continuous Supreme Court treatment of corporate constitutional rights consistent with the Field ration59
ale are belied by his own discussion of cases such as Hale v. Henkel,1
which held the privilege against self-incrimination to be personal in
nature and therefore not available to corporations, but opined in dic-

tum that corporations are entitled to protection from unreasonable
searches and seizures. 160 It seems incongruous that it is consistent with

the Field rationale to accord corporations freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures, a right grounded in that most intimate of personal freedoms, the right of privacy, 161 but inconsistent to give corpora-

tions free speech rights because they cannot actually speak.
Despite O'Kelley's claims that it is a category-mistake to assume
that corporations can speak, he is willing to admit that they have a
protected right to commercial speech similar to that of an individual
because "[c]orporate advertising is a part of the business." 162 If commercial speech aimed directly at creating a sale is part of the corporate

business and therefore properly protected by the first amendment,
O'Kelley does not explain why political speech aimed less directly but

no less surely at advancing the economic prospects of the corporation is
the common name-necessarily affects their interests. Whatever confiscates or imposes
burdens on its property, confiscates or imposes burdens on their property, otherwise nobody would be injured by the proceeding. Whatever advances the prosperity or wealth
of the corporation, advances proportionately the .prosperity and business of the corporators, otherwise no one would be-benefited. It is impossible to conceive of a corporation
suffering an injury or reaping a benefit except through its members. The legal entity, the
metaphysical being, that is called a corporation, cannot feel either.
Id
The more basic ground for decision in both of Justice Field's lower court opinions was the
use of principles of statutory construction and legislative history to conclude that the framers of
the fourteenth amendment intended it to have a "broad and catholic spirit." Id at 398.
158. O'Kelley, supra note 15, at 1355-56.
159. 201 U.S. 43 (1906). O'Kelley's discussion makes it clear that it is not easy to interpret this
case as consistent with the Field rationale, although he manages to do so. O'Kelley, supra note 15,
at 1357-58.
160. 201 U.S. at 86.
161. See E. FISHER, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 11 (1970):
The underlying purpose of those who framed our Constitution and its Amendments,
particularly the Fourth, was to place salutary restrictions upon the power of government.
They sought to guard against any attempt, by legislation or otherwise, to permit unreasonable governmental intrusion into private affrs. The Fourth Amendment and its
state counterparts embody a comprehensive right of privacy for the individual against
unwarranted violations thereof by officers of government.
id
162. O'Kelley, supra note 15, at 1373.
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not also a "part of the business" and therefore properly protected by
the first amendment. For example, the speech involved in Consolidated
Edison was clearly political, rather than commercial in nature, but it
was just as clearly designed to advance the economic prospects of the
speaker.1 63 It is now clear that corporate political activity has a direct
impact on the economic success of many corporations." 6 Even simple
image advertising (public relations) can have a substantial impact on a
company's balance sheet. 161
O'Kelley's reliance on the Field rationale is further weakened by
the need to recognize what he terms the "associational rationale" to
account for such cases as NAACP v. Button, 16 6 and NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson,67 in which the Supreme Court recognized the right of
political speech for those corporations formed for the purpose of advancing and realizing the political goals of their members. O'Kelley
concedes that "when individuals with a desire to express their common
views exercise their freedom of expression through the medium of a
corporation and its agents, the corporation may assert that the expression is protected under the first amendment."' 68 Again, there is no convincing reason why protection should be afforded to the political
speech of a corporation using that speech to further its owners' goals of
propagating a particular political philosophy but not to the political
speech of a corporation using that speech to further its owners' goals of
achieving a profit.1 69 The distinction becomes even less clear when a
163. Communications by for-profit corporations are more often prompted at least mar-

ginally by economic motivation. By some reasoning, therefore, it is commercial speech.
The pro-nuclear message of Consolidated Edison, an operator of nuclear power plants
whose economic future is at least partially dependent on the expanded use of nuclear

power, is hardly less commercial than the message of Central Hudson Gas & Electric
encouraging the consumption of electricity instead of other fuels.
Schwarz & Straus, Uneasy Spectre Raised by CorporateSpeech Rulings, Legal Times of Wash.,
Aug. 11, 1980, at 15, coL 3.
164. Note, CorporatePoliticalAffairsPrograms, 70 YALE L.J. 821, 827 (1961):

A company's political persuasion program may be an important factor in its economic success. The ability to generate public support may be used defensively-to resist
government measures likely to decrease profits-or offensively-to secure adoption of

measures which will assist the company to increase its income.
id
165. See L. GOLDEN, ONLY BY PUBLIC CONSENT 370 (1969); H. MARQUIS, THE CHANGING
CORPORATE IMAGE 37 (1970); B. ZOLLO, THE DOLLARS AND SENSE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS 3
(1967).

166. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
167. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
168. O'Kelley, supra note 15, at 1366.
169. The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REv. 57, 166 (1978):
Political expression and associational activity should not be less protected when individuals are organized in a business corporation. Even though not organized primarily for
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business corporation attempts to advance a particular political philsophy to foster an environment in which more profitable business
activities can occur. As already discussed, 7 ' if political speech is disqualified from first amendment protection because of an economic motive, there will be very little political speech left for anyone to hear.
O'Kelley attempts to distinguish the situations by utilizing a passage from NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson in which the Supreme
Court stressed the nexus between the NAACP and its members, stating
that the NAACP "is the appropriate party to assert these rights, because it and its members are in every practical sense identical." '7 1
Thus, O'Kelley would allow business corporations to engage in political speech only if they "share unanimity of interest and desires to ex'
press their common views." 172
There is no doubt that corporations such as the NAACP should be
allowed to engage in political speech. But the same reasoning that supports protection of political speech for such organizations also supports
protection of political speech of business corporations. Just as the
members of the NAACP share the common goal of furtherance of a
political point of view, so do the shareholders of most business corporations share the common goal of obtaining a monetary reward.1 73 Just
as the NAACP's speech is a means toward the common goal, so is a
business corporation's speech a means toward a common goal. Just as
some members of the NAACP may disagree with particular statements
and particular programs of the organization, 174 so some shareholders of
political purposes, shareholders or their representatives may find political expression
necessary to achieve their goals. When shareholders choose to advance political ideas
collectively to further business objectives, their association and expression should be protected.
Id
170. See note 122 supra.

171. 357 U.S. at 459.
172. O'Kelley, supra note 15, at 1365. O'Kelley views the result in Belloui as correct only
because the invalidated prohibition banned even corporate speech authorized by unanimous
shareholder activity. Apparently any law which made an exception for such speech would meet
with O'Kelley's approval. Id at 1369.
173. M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATON 30 n.2 (1976).
174. Certainly, members of organizations such as the NAACP cannot always agree as to the
best method of advancing the general cause in which they all believe. Richard Kluger has chronicled some of the disagreements among civil rights proponents as to the proper approach to the
1954 desegregation cases that culminated in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
R. KLUGER, 2 SIMPLE JUSTICE 677 (1975).

Perhaps an even more vivid example of the disagreements over the means of accomplishing
an agreed-upon goal is the controversy involving the right of American Nazis to march in Skokie,
Illinois, which divided the American Civil Liberties Union. N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1979, at 59, col
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a profit-seeking corporation may disagree with some of its political
statements and programs. Nonetheless, if the political speech of the
former is protected, so should be that of the latter. Unanimous agreement on the methods of achieving a corporation's goals is no more
likely to be achieved among the owners of a "political" corporation
than among the owners of a "business" corporation.
It has been argued that owners of a political corporation such as
the NAACP realize that such a corporation will engage in political
speech, but that shareholders of business corporations do not. This argument operates on the false assumption that shareholders of business
corporations have never heard of lobbying, are unaware of the history
of corporate campaign contributions, and do not read the popular literature in which corporate political advertisements appear almost daily.
Another major problem with O'Kelley's theories concerning the
consistent application of the Field rationale lies in the need to protect
the free speech rights of media corporations in cases such as Grosjeanv.
American Press Co. 175 O'Kelley freely admits that such protection is
necessary because free speech is "essential to the business of newspapers," 176 but insists that no category-mistake is involved because "[tihe
corporation cannot speak, but its business requires individual speech
and a corporation may be held legally responsible for the speech of its
agents." 177 Why it is not a category-mistake to say that a media corporation can engage in speech through its agents because it is responsible
for the legal consequences of their acts, but it is a category-mistake to
(accurately) make the same statement as to business corporations is not
clear.
If it is consistent with the Field rationale to allow media corporations to exercise free speech rights because it is necessary to protect
their business, it is also proper to accord the same rights to non-media
corporations whose speech can also be vital to their long-range economic security. 178 In fact, it is the lack of a reasonable basis on which
to distinguish between the free speech rights of media corporations and
those of non-media corporations that precipitated Chief Justice Burger's entire concurring opinion in Bellotti.' 9
175. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
176. O'Kelley, supra note 15, at 1360.
177. Id

178. See note 164 supra.
179. 435 U.S. at 795-802.

This is more than just a hypothetical problem. A pre-Bellottl New York law aimed at
preventing corporations from making expenditures for political purposes, if construed literally,
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Even if one were to accept O'Kelley's theory of a consistent application of the Field rationale by the Supreme Court, his criticisms of the
theoretical underpinnings of the corporate political speech cases would
still miss the mark. O'Kelley effectively ignores the entire thrust of the
Supreme Court's content-oriented rationale for protecting commercial
and corporate political speech.'8 0 O'Kelley's argument that a contentoriented theory of free speech protection is theoretically invalid because it conflicts with his perception of the case law regarding corporate constitutional rights is unduly narrow.
It was clearly rational for the Supreme Court to treat Bellotti and
ConsolidatedEdison as primarily free speech cases, rather than primarily corporate law cases.18 1 Given the appropriateness of this characterization, which Justice Powell established in the opening pages of
Bellotti, 182 the theoretical foundation of the corporate political speech
cases has a firm base. If the Supreme Court's extension of first amendment protection to corporate political speech is inconsistent with the
Field rationale, it is not surprising-the recognition of the protected
nature of the corporate political speech at issue in Bellotti and ConsolidatedEdison did not spring from the body of corporate law discussed
by O'Kelley. Rather, the recognition of a right of political speech for
corporations evolved from the Court's recognition of the right to receive commercial speech. The Supreme Court's decision to extend
statements is theoretically
freedom of expression to corporate political
18 3
ancestors.
doctrinal
true
its
with
consistent
Because corporate political speech is protected on the basis of its
value to the listener, rather than its value to the corporation itself, the
bulk of O'Kelley's criticism is irrelevant. The value to the receiver of
corporate political speech is not affected by the fact that the speaker of
a particular message is a corporation formed for profit rather than the
NAACP, or a non-media corporation rather than a newspaper. The
might have prevented The New York Times and other newspapers from endorsing candidates for
political office. Pecora v. Queens County Bar Ass'n, 46 Misc. 2d 530, 260 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct.
1965), discussed in Schaefer, supra note 122, at 2-3 n.6, 13-14.
180. An even minimally adequate discussion of the right to receive theory upon which Bellotti
is predicated is conspicuously absent from O'Kelley's article.
181. Smith, supra note 106, at 112.
182. 435 U.S. at 775-76.
183. Kiley, PACing the Burger Court: The Corporate Right to Speak and the Public Right to
Hear After First National Bank v. Bellotti, 22 ARZ. L. REv. 427, 439 (1980); Tucker, Use of
CorporateFunds/orPoliticalSpeech, 53 CoNN. B.J. 185, 201 (1979); Note, 20 B.C. L. REv. 1003,
1017.
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value of these messages to the receiver is ignored by O'Kelley and unduly minimized by other critics of Bellotti and ConsolidatedEdison.
What critics overlook is that Bellotti and Consolidated Edison
merely recognized the realities of American political and democratic
life. Corporations have been involved in politics and engaged in political speech since around 1800.184 Corporations should and must be involved in American political life, and that has never been more true
than today.
Corporations are and must be political participants; in performing their basic social function-the production and distribution of goods and services-they are, in this general
process of goal attainment, inextricably bound up with the
multitude of institutions and interests present in American society. They are, accordingly, subject to continuous claims by
these coexisting interests and institutions
and, in return, must
18 5
seek to effect their own claims.
To a large extent, the need for corporate political speech and participation flows from the increasingly extensive governmental reaction
with and control over the business sector. Businesses do little today
that is not directly and actively affected by government.186 Few managerial decisions are unaffected by health, safety, environmental, labor,
antitrust, tax, tariff or some other variety of legislation or administrative action."8 7 It is natural, proper, and in keeping with our traditions
for corporations to react to this governmental influence by entering the
political arena through various means such as lobbying, electoral activity, and political advertising. 88 The profit-and-loss statement of a corporation may well be determined by how vigorously and effectively
that corporation engages in these political endeavors.' 8 9
184. See notes 28-29 supra.

185. EPSTEIN, supra note 28, at 276.
186. Id at 133.
187. Comment, CorporateAdvocacyAdvertising: When Business'Rightto Speak Threatensthe
Administrationof Justice, IV DET. C. OF L. REv. 623, 626 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment].

188. P. DOUGLAS, ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT 32 (1952) ("Wherever government controls a
business, it becomes inevitable that the business should try to control the government"); Budde,
Business PoliticalAction Committees, in PARTIES, INTEREST GROUPS AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE
LAWS (M. Malbin ed. 1980) ("Mhe more regulated an industry is and the more obvious an indus-

try is a congressional target, the more likely it is to have a political action committee").

189. See Note, CorporatePoliticalAffairsPrograms,70 YALE L.J. 821, 827, 834 (1961). This is
true of political expenditures only indirectly affecting the corporation, and even of charitable contributions. In The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARv. L. REv. 57, 167 n.33 (1980), it is pointed

out:
Corporate expression designed to influence political decisions having only indirect effects
on the corporation may often further corporate purposes. For example, a corporation
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Because corporate political activity has been for a long time, and

remains today, a necessary form of corporate endeavor, it is well established and well accepted in our political and social system. Corpora-

tions are today, and have been since our early history, an important
interest group "accorded precisely the same political status as other
groups."' 90

An obvious example of the acceptance of corporations as legitimate participants in American political life, and hence as legitimate

political speakers, lies in the practice of corporate lobbying. Such lobbying has long been allowed,' 9 ' and has recently reached significant
proportions. 92 Although such lobbying is subject to some modest controls, 193 it was formally legitimized by the Supreme Court in Eastern
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,"' in
which the practice of lobbying was held to be outside the scope of the
prohibitions of the Sherman Act.'9 5 This case involved a challenge by

the trucking industry to the lobbying practices of the railroad industry,
and, more specifically, the latter's attempts to block Pennsylvania legislation favorable to trucking industry efforts to secure a greater share of

the long-distance freight business.' 9 6 Without mentioning that the offending lobbyists were corporations, the Supreme Court held that a re-

striction of lobbying would have important constitutional
dependent for its success on the high quality of its employees may have a stake in political decisions which affect the corporation's ability to attract superior talent. Political
expression intended to influence the creation of an attractive environment may further
corporate objectives.
Id Cf. A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 143, 98 A.2d 581 (corporate donations to private
university intended in part to ensure a supply of trained personnel for corporate employment held
intra vires), appealdismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953).
190. EPsTpNn, supra note 28, at 125.

191. For a brief history of early lobbying, see K. SCHRIFrGIESSER, THE LOBBYIsTs 3-21
(1951).
192. Special Report, The CorporateImage: PR to the Rescue, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 22, 1979, at 54
(500 major corporations and 1,700 trade associations have lobbying headquarters in Washington,
D.C.).
193. The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 271-272 (1976). For a critique of
the restraints on corporate lobbying see M. NADEL, CORPORATIONs AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 48-49 (1976); Land, FederalLobbying Disclosure Legislation, 17 HARV. J. LEGIS. 295, 300-

01(1980).
194. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
195. Id at 136.
196. Id at 128-131.
This dispute apparently continues. In a recent full-page advertisement, the Association of
American Railroads cited various facts and figures in an attempt to convince the reading public
that "public subsidies to trucks and barges throw competition out of balance." TIME, Apr. 11,
1981, at 14.
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implications,19 7 and found no basis in the legislative character of the
Sherman Act to "hold that the government retains the power to act in
this representative capacity and yet hold, at the same time, that the
people cannot freely inform the government of their wishes ... .
In language which foreshadowed the emergence of the right to receive rationale, the Court also said:
A construction of the Sherman Act that would disqualify people from taking a public position on matters in which they are
financially interested would thus deprive the government of a
valuable source of information and at the same time deprive
the people of their right to petition in the very instances in
which that right may be of the most importance to them.' 99
Contrary holdings in Bellotti and Consolidated Edison surely
would have required that a serious reevaluation of the concept of protected corporate lobbying be undertaken. 2" Yet, no critic of those decisions has advocated a change in the law to curtail this well
established and well accepted practice. Although Watergate-era abuses
have spurred consideration of dramatic revamping of lobbying regulations, 201 the legislation now under consideration does not contemplate
limiting or restricting the quantity of lobbying,2 2 and does not consider
treating corporations differently from other lobbyists.
If corporations were denied the right to lobby or to otherwise convey political messages, the right to receive would be dealt a severe
blow. This point is not emphasized by the majority rulings in Bellotti
197. 365 U.S. at 138.
198. Id at 137. In this passage, the Supreme Court emphasized the value of free speech to

self-government in terms quite consistent with Meiklejohn's theories. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
199. Id at 139 (emphasis added).
200. Justice Powell's majority opinion in Bellotti noted:
The State's paternalism evidenced by this statute is illustrated by the fact that Massachusetts does not prohibit lobbying by corporations, which are free to exert as much

influence on the people's representatives as their resources and inclinations permit. Presumably the legislature thought its members competent to resist the pressures and blandishments of lobbying but had markedly less confidence in the electorate. If the First

Amendment protects the right of corporations to petition legislative and administrative
bodies, see California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited 404 U.S. 508, 510-11
(1972); Eastern A PresidentsConf. . NoerrMotorFreight,Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-138
(1961), there hardly can be less reason for allowing corporate views to be presented
openly to the people when they are to take action in their sovereign capacity.
435 U.S. at 792 n.31.
Additionally, corporate expenditures for lobbying are just as much a burden on dissenting
shareholders as are expenditures for electioneering. Id at 793.
201.

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, PROPOSALS To REVISE THE LOBBYING LAW (1980).

202. Land, FederalLobbying Disclosure Reform Legislation, 17 -ARv.J. LgOis. 295, 320

(1980).
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and ConsolidatedEdison. Those opinions take for granted the value of
free political speech-and it is understandable that they should-without examining the potential benefits to the right to receive arising from
the nature of the corporate source. While the majority opinions omitted mention of the peculiar benefits stemming from a corporate source,
the dissenters in both cases took the opportunity to highlight the potential disadvantages of allowing speech from such a source. The majority's omission in each case should be rectified. No fair evaluation of
the practical effects of extending first amendment protection to the
political speech of corporations can be undertaken without regard to
the advantages of the corporate source. Unless these advantages are
considered, it is difficult to fully appreciate the Supreme Court's theoretical approach in Bellotti and ConsolidatedEdison which based the
holdings on the right to receive.
Corporate political speech is worthy of protection if only because
of the importance of the source to our society. The corporation, as an
institution, is a pervasive and critically important element of American
life:

2 03

[T]he large corporation is an indispensable element in our
economy and community.
A preeminently American phenomenon, the very large
corporation, for better or worse, depending on one's point of
view, has done more than any other institution to render that
economy distinct from all others. Far from being aberrant
and dissonant, the large corporation-warts and all-is the
essence of American life as we now know it.2°4
Without saying "What's good for large corporations is good for
America," 2 5 the point must be made that the corporate voice is one of
the many important voices that deserve to be heard as our people and
politicians make the critical decisions of the 1980's. It should not be
silenced. Trends in the American political system flow like tides in response to the various voices and pressures applied. The pendulum
swings back and forth, now more conservative, now more liberal. Only
if important voices are censored is the pendulum likely to swing too far
in one direction, throwing the system out of kilter. If the corporate
203. See H. OLECK, MODERN CORPORATION LAW § 2, at 4 (Student ed. 1960) ("The corporation is a basic part of our entire social and economic structure").
204. J. GLOVER, THE REVOLtTIONARY CORPORATIONs 428 (1980).

205. Shareholders and employees of the Chrysler Corporation might well have some sympathy for the feelings expressed in this statement.
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voice is silenced, there is an increased possibility that governmental
regulation and interference might go too far. If such does occur, and a
critical institution like the corporation is unduly injured, the adverse
consequences may affect all Americans.
Justice White's Bellotti dissent argued that the right to receive
would not be seriously injured if corporate views are suppressed, because shareholders, employees and customers would still be free to
communicate. 0 6 At the same time, Justice White recognized that commercial speech "could not be restricted without impinging seriously
upon the right to receive information. '0 7 The latter admission destroys the efficacy of the former argument because political speech is, if
anything, less resilient and more subject to being unduly chilled by
governmental regulation than is commercial speech.20 8 It is unrealistic
to contend that if corporate political speech is censored that stockholders, employees, and customers will rush in to effectively fill the void.20 9
Justice White also ignored that, to an extent, the corporate point of
view may be a unique one and therefore doubly valuable to the right to
receive. As Professor Henn has stated, regardless of the various legal
theories involved, a corporation "has group interests distinguishable
from the individual interests of its individual members. 2 10 It would be
impossible for corporate political speech to reflect only the views of
individual shareholders of the major corporations. The owners, as individuals, have conflicting concerns and values, despite the common
206. 435 U.S. at 765. Justice White also suggested that corporate speech was entitled to less
protection because it does not further self-expression reasoning that "ideas which are not a product of individual choice" are less worthy of protection. Id This argument has been criticized:
The dissent nowhere suggested why corporate advocacy, even from a self-expression
point of view, does not further the individual's right to speech. Indeed, the private citizen may be delighted to see views with which he agrees presented in a visible and important forum. On the other hand, if he is sufficiently upset, he can divest his holdings, or
use his corporate vote to speak his mind.
Why "ideas which are not a product of individual choice" are entitled to less protection is not clear. This notion, like the entire argument, can arise only from a misconception of fundamental first amendment theory. The self-expression protected by the
Constitution inures to the declarant. The listener's self-realization and self-fulfillment
are equally protected. The listener may raise his voice in support or rebuttal, and make a
choice from the views raised. It is this choice which is self-fulfillment. Expression without an audience and without rebuttal is valueless.
Comment, supra note 187, at 646-47.
207. 435 U.S. at 765.
208. Schaefer, supra note 122, at 36.
209. Contributions by individuals to corporate-sponsored political action committees indicate
that to some extent individual action can fill this void. But there is no reason to believe that
individual action could provide effective substitute advocacy in the broad range of areas in which
corporations are now involved in political speech.
210. H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORaTIONS § 78, at 107 (2d ed. 1970).
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ownership of the corporation which they share. Thus, the corporate
voice may well be a separate and unique one-not representative of all

of the views of any single shareholder or employee, but representative
of part of the views and interests of all of them.

O'Kelley argues, as have others, that corporations, as artificial entities, cannot physically speak, and concludes that corporate treasuries

are used merely to amplify the views of management. 21 This argument is subject to serious criticism. Certainly, there are cases where
corporate officers have abused their authority by utilizing corporate

funds to espouse their personal ideas and advance their personal

causes. 212 This is just one of countless forms of abuse of power by corporate officials. It should be curbed, as should embezzlement, expense-

padding, and self-dealing, but its existence does not justify elimination
of first amendment protection for corporate political speech.
Such abuse, fortunately, appears to be the exception rather than
the rule. As a general principle, "[t]he premise that management will

normally run corporate affairs without regard to its own self-interest is
probably accurate as to business decisions."2'13 More specifically, it has

been stated that "managers, in conducting corporate political activities
generally act in accordance with organizational rather than individual

policies and seek to accomplish company as distinguished from personal objectives." 2

4

Indeed, a survey of the actual practice in corpo-

rate speech supports this conclusion,215 and it has been noted:
It is unrealistic to suggest that the considerable costs of
purchasing advertising space or broadcast time would not re211. O'Kelley, supra note 15, at 1377.
212. See EPSTEIN, supra note 28, at 129-30.
213. M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 30 (1976).
214. EPSTEIN, supra note 28, at 124-25.
Professor Baker has suggested that abuse of corporate funds by management in the form of
political speech for personal causes is not likely to be a widespread phenomenon because "the use
of corporate funds to fulfill management in carrying out its fiduciary duties is normally described
as either taxable compensation or illegal conversion." Baker, CommercialSpeech, A Problem in
the Theory of-Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REv. 1, 36 (1976) (citing INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 61(a); 3A
W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 1102-12 (rev. perm. ed.
1975)).
215. In addition to other political advertisements mentioned in this article, the author has
recently observed a Union Carbide Corp. advertisement seeking public support for legislation
which would supposedly make America more competitive in the world market, Austin-American
Statesman, Apr. 30, 1981, at B12; a Mobil Corporation advertisement supporting recent government leasing of off-shore oil drilling sites, Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 10, 1981, at 22, col. 2-3;
a two-page advertisement by the United States Steel Corp. seeking public support for tax reform
to encourage industrial investment, TIME, Apr. 13, 1981, at 8-9; and a three-page essay on how to
control inflation by limiting government spending sponsored by the Smith-Kline Corporation,
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 23, 1981, at 67-69.
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strain management from using corporate funds to wage personal public opinion campaigns that were not in the interests
of the corporation. Indeed, anyone who has read corporate
"issue advertising" in quality newspapers and news
magazines will recognize that the items discussed generally
relate to the concerns of the corporation, although1 they
may
6
not promote the company or its products directly.?
Generally, it should not be surprising to learn that the personal
political views of most corporate executives parallel the views which
are most beneficial to the corporation's economic well-being.217 However, a corporate officer's personal views or interests may occasionally
diverge from those best serving the corporate interest. For example, it
is likely that in 1972 at least a moderate number of business executives
across the country felt strongly enough about the Vietnam war to have
been "one issue" voters who personally supported Democratic candidate George McGovern for President. At the same time, if those managers believed that the re-election of President Nixon, for some direct
or indirect reason, would have been more likely beneficial for the economy in general and the company's profitability 218 in particular, they
would have been under a fiduciary obligation to support President
Nixon's re-election if they had deemed any spending of corporate
funds worthwhile and legal.2 19 One author has suggested that:
[Ilt requires little imagination to think of instances of potential conflict between the manager's individual interest and
the objectives of the organization. For example, while tariff
barriers aid a firm in a protected domestic industry, they may
also have the effect of increasing prices of other items con216. Schaefer, supra note 122, at 13.
If corporate political advertising does stray from legitimate corporate purposes, the public
will likely make the corporation pay for its sins. In the mid-1960's, Schick Electric joined in the
battle in California over a referendum regarding pornography. The public apparently believed
the corporation had overstepped its bounds, and the result was a boycott which apparently reduced Schick's profits by 53%. See EPSTEIN, supra note 28, at 130.
217. EPSTEIN, supra note 28, at 13 ("As a general rule, however, the political interests of the
manager are in harmony with the objectives of his organization").
218. The normal function of business corporations is to undertake activity with the purpose
and expectation of making a profit. W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 60
(4th ed. 1969).
219. See Baker, CommercialSpeech: A Problemin the Theory of Freedom, 62 iowA L. REV. 1,
16 (1976). In the commercial speech sphere, Professor Baker has hypothesized a situation in
which a whiskey distilling and distributing company's management and owners are all teetotalers
who personally oppose the use of alcohol, but recognize the value of advertising to the ultimate
profit of the venture. Although the example is far-fetched, it does make the point that a person's
individual interests are not always completely congruent with the interests of the corporation in
which he or she owns stock.
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sumed by the corporate officer. Similarly, defeat of air- or

water-pollution control measures lowers the operating costs of
a company but increases the health hazards faced by the cor-

porate manager.2 2u
When the personal interests of corporate managers do not represent the best interests of the corporation, the managers can use corpo-

rate funds only to support the latter interests. When they do so via the
conduit of political speech, that speech represents the corporation's best

interests, not those of the managers. It is a unique voice, therefore, and
especially valuable to the right to receive. Even when corporate man-

agers do not personally subscribe to a political cause that appears to be
in the corporation's best interest, they should have the power, and per-

haps the duty,2 2 ' to advance the corporate position by utilization of
corporate political speech. That the speech must be communicated
through representatives or agents should not affect its protected quali222
ty.
The final important point about the corporate message which

highlights its value to the right to receive is the importance of the information frequently conveyed by such entities. Soon after the decision

was handed down, it was predicted that "Bellott signals a revolutionary change which cannot but elevate the level of debate concerning
political affairs and governmental action,""z

and there is evidence to

220. EPSTEIN, supra note 28, at 13.
221. It is the duty of management "to administer the corporate affairs for the common benefit
of all the stockholders, and exercise their best care, skill and judgment in the management of the
corporate business solely in the interests of the corporation." W. KNEPPER, LIABILITIES OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 1.02, at 4 (2d ed. 1973).
More specifically, it has been noted.
Corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to both the corporation and the shareholders to
act in good faith. They may not act in a manner contrary to the best interests of the
corporation. Spending on referendums may well fall within this fiduciary duty. Thus, if
a director can reasonably claim that an expenditure is in the best interests of the corporation and will not result in the waste of the corporate assets, the expenditure should be
permitted. When a referendum issue is closely related to a corporation's business, and
the results of the referendum would have a substantial effect on the corporation's profits,
directors should have not only the right but the duty to publicize the corporation's position.
Comment, First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti: CorporatePoliticalSpeech in Ballot-Measure
Campaigns, 8 N.Y.U. REv.L. & Soc. CHANGE 63, 79 (1978-1979).
222. Note, First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti: TheReopening ofthe CorporateMouthThe Corporation'sRight to Speak, 21 ARiz. L. REv. 841, 851 (1979).
No one suggests that the political speech rights of our major elected officials should be curtailed because their public statements are usually composed by others, and the content of the
message delivered may well vary depending upon which speechwriter is used. See Bormann,
Ghostwritingand the Rhetorical Critic, XLVI QJ. SPEECH 284 (1960).
223. Rome and Roberts, Bellotti andthe FirstAmendment; A New Era in CorporateSpeech? 3
CORP. L. Rav. 28, 49 (1980). See also Tucker, Use of CorporateFunds/orPoliticalSpeech, 53
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support this prediction.
Corporations have special knowledge in their fields of endeavor.
The more complex and technical a political issue, the more likely it is
that a corporate voice can illuminate it. Thus, the insert ban in Consolidated Edison was particularly inappropriate because in an era of
skyrocketing petroleum prices and developing energy shortages, it is
important that the consumer be given input from regulated electrical
utilities "to explain the complexities of the subject about which they
have peculiar knowledge."224

Some types of information may be available only from corporations with the tremendous resources, monetary and otherwise, necessary to gather it."2 It is generally recognized that large accumulations
of capital make possible the magnificient technical and productive advances of the modem American economy.226 These accumulations of
capital in the corporate form may also make possible the gathering of
information relevant to many of our great political issues-information
which would not be obtainable absent the corporate form or available
absent the corporate voice.
Similarly, it is not difficult to foresee situations in which only big
business can muster the resources necessary to persuasively challenge
big government and big labor on issues so significant that the latter
entities should not go unchallenged. 27
Examples of the beneficial aspects of corporate political speech are
not difficult to find. As early as the 1930's, A&P Food Stores responded to legislation introduced in Congress which would have had
the probable effect of putting chain stores out of business, by running
advertisements which explained why the abolition of chain stores
would injure consumers, farmers, and A&P's nearly 90,000 employees.
The ad stated frankly:
Since the task we have set before us is one involving the widest dissemination of complete information to all of the American people, and since this is a profession in which we are not
.expert, we have engaged Carl Byoir & Associates, public relations counsel, to do this work. We realize that our views are
CONN. B.J. 185, 202 (1979) (Bellol "should have a beneficient impact on the democratic process.
The more opportunity there is to publicly express points of view, regardless of the origin of the
expression, the greater is the opportunity for the electorate to be better informed.").
224. Note, 44 ALB. L. REV. 515, 521-22 (1980).
225. See Comment, supra note 187, at 658.
226. See J. GLOVER, THE REVOLUTIONARY CORPORATIONs 427 (1980).
227. See Comment, supra note 187, at 658.
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seldom news. We know, therefore, that we must be prepared
to spend a substantial sum of money in telling our story to all
of the American people. 28
The public responded to the ads with an outpouring of support and the
bill was defeated.22 9
More recently, Mobil Corporation has spent millions of dollars explaining its position on various energy issues. The information contained in these "advertorials" has helped to fill gaps left by what was
2 30
felt to be mediocre coverage of the energy crisis by the mass media
and it has been said that even "critics would be hard put to deny that
Mobil's editorial insistence has brought new facts to the public debate
on energy, and in the process has influenced editorial thought and
political actions."23' 1
Herbert Schmertz, the driving force behind Mobil's issue advertising campaign, offers yet another example:
[A] health insurance company startled readers with advertisements urging them not to submit to surgery without obtaining
a second opinion. This, it felt, would not only prevent unnecessary operations but also hold down the skyrocketing cost of
medical care. The insurance company's view has since become public policy and, in some states, the law.2 32
In summary, those who attack the theoretical basis of Bellotti and
ConsolidatedEdison, while ignoring the prudence of the right to receive
theory which underlay those decisions, are being unduly narrowminded. The corporate viewpoint is important, unique, and, in at least
some instances, largely irreplaceable. At the very least, it is one more
voice to be heard, and, in America, on that basis alone it should find
protection in the shadow of the first amendment.
228. Fox, Business/Media Influence: Who Does What to Whom?, BUSINESS AND THE MEDIA
167 (C. Aronoff ed. 1979).

229. Id A similar scenario was played out in 1962 when the U.S. Savings and Loan League
sought and received public support to defeat President Kennedy's proposal to withhold the taxes
due on interest earned on savings deposits. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., THE WASHINGTON LOB8Y 3 (2d ed. 1979).
More recently, The Savings & Loan Foundation has undertaken a massive advertising campaign to solicit public support for a proposed law to provide that the first $1,000 of interest on
savings earned by an individual (and $2,000 for joint returns) shall be tax free. TIME, Mar. 16,
1981, at 17.
230. Baram, Newspapers: Their Coverage andBig Business, in BIG BUSINESS AND THE MASS
MEDIA 159-60 (B. Rubin ed. 1977).
231. Banks, The Rise ofthe Newsocracy, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 1981, at 58.
232. H. SCHmERTZ, CORPORATIONS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 14 (1978).
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B. PracticalEffects

The two most serious practical objections lodged against extending
first amendment protection to corporate political speech are those qualifiedly rejected in Bellotti--() subsidization by minority shareholders
of corporate political speech with which they disagree, and (2) the potential for undue influence by corporations in the political sphere.
These criticisms were not finally laid to rest in either Bellotti or Consolidated Edison, and are likely to be presented for court consideration
again in the future. Also of continuing concern will be the impact of
these decisions upon electoral reform legislation. Close scrutiny indicates that these arguments do not strongly mitigate against protection
for corporate political speech.
1. Protection of Minority Shareholders.
The Belloti decision did not completely eliminate protection of
minority shareholders as a basis for censoring corporate political
speech. Rather, the particular law at issue was found overinclusive,
underinclusive, and not directly related to the supposed goal,233 leaving
open the possibility that a properly framed ban on corporate political
speech could be upheld.3 4 Actually, the possibility is slight. To eliminate such a law's underinclusiveness, all corporate political activity,
including the accepted practice of lobbying, would have to be prohibited-an unlikely development.23 5
The argument itself is based on two cases, Machinists v. Street,236
andAbood v. DetroitBoardofEducation,237 which held that it is unconstitutional to require employees to subsidize their union's political
speech. The majority opinion in Bellotti provides the two answers
which are dispositive of the shareholder subsidy argument. First, every
shareholder investing in a major corporation realizes that the corporation's management is likely to undertake any number of specific actions
233. 435 U.S. at 792-95.
234. The Bellotti opinion assumed, for purposes of argument, that the protection of minority
shareholders could constitute a compelling interest. Id at 795.

235. Although unlikely, it is possible that some sort of partial rebate to the dissenting shareholders could be fashioned after the remedy allowed in Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961),
and Abood v. DetroitBoard of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
Other methods of protecting minority shareholders that fall short of a complete ban on corporate speech are critically examined in Fox, CorporatePoliticalSpeech: The Effect of First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti Upon StatutoryLimitations on CorporateReferendum Spending, 67 Ky.
LJ. 75, 98-101 (1978-1979).

236. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
237. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
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regarding the corporation's affairs with which the shareholder will disagree.238 These actions may range from investment and planning decisions to employee relations decisions, to matters of commercial speech,
lobbying, and, as in Bellotti, political speech. Corporate political
speech is just one of thousands of such decisions, and not a matter of
special concern" 9 for the shareholder whose primary motivation in investing, no doubt, is to obtain an economic benefit, not to make, or
refrain from making a political statement.24 ° Of course, persons who
join any association or organization with political activities, be it a corporation, trade association, professional society, or union, are bound
sooner or later to find themselves supporting, however reluctantly,
political activity and speech with which they disagree. 24 1 As a practical
matter, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court could ever alter this
situation.
The second answer is that Abood and Street are distinguishable
because of the relative ease with which shareholders who dislike the
corporate political message can disassociate themselves from it.2 42 The
employees in Abood and Street had their jobs, their entire source of
livelihood on the line. On the other hand, few corporate shareholders
would be seriously inconvenienced if they chose to oppose a corporate
political statement by withdrawing their interests and reinvesting else243
where.
Additionally, shareholders who oppose the corporate message can
also utilize any number of means to alter management's course, including the derivative suit, or intracorporate remedies such as voting to
elect new directors, amending the by-laws, or submitting shareholder
resolutions. 2 " If it is argued that these methods are not effective 24 5
238. 435 U.S. at 794 n.34 (1978).
239. Fox, supra note 235, at 98. ("The minority shareholder's pocketbook interest would be
adversely affected by any ill-advised investment or spending decision by management."); Comment, First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti: Corporate Political Speech in Ballot-Measure
Campaigns, 8 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 63, 79 (1978-1979).
240. Schaefer, supra note 122, at 12.
241. A. HEARD, THE CosTs OF DEMOCRACY 210 (1960).
242. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 n.34 (1978).
243. See Comment, supra note 187, at 647.

244. For a discussion of the use of such devices, see Schaefer, supra note 122, at 8 n.37; The
Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARv. L. REv. 57, 167 n.33 (1978); Note, First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti: The Reopening of the CorporateMouth-The CorporateRight to Speak, 21
ARiz. L. REv. 841, 861 (1979).
245. The argument that shareholder remedies are completely ineffective in this area is belied

by the settlements concluded in two cases involving illegal corporate campaign contributions by
Gulf Oil Company and the Northrup Corporation. Comment, CorporateDemocracyand The CorporatePoliticalContribution, 61 IowA L. REv. 545, 576-78 (1975). See also Tyler and Bateman, Is
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because most corporations remain management-controlled, 246 the answer is that this is an indictment of the entire corporate structure and
not a reason to isolate corporate political speech for special treatment.
Investors are primarily interested in profits, not the political activity or speech that may be helpful in obtaining them. Such speech contributes to the economic welfare of all shareholders,247 and opposition
by a few to a particular corporate message does not justify totally silencing this important first amendment source. 24
2. Undue Corporate Influence
Those who view critically the extension of first amendment protection to corporate political speech tend to emphasize the possibility that
corporations will dominate political discussion in America if their
political speech is given first amendment protection. Several commentators worry that the tremendous amounts of wealth that large corporations can muster and translate into political speech will allow them
to dominate the first amendment's marketplace of ideas.249 Justice
White's Belloti dissent subscribed to this view, but offered no hard evidence to support it,250 and little has appeared in the literature. The
CorporateSpeech Free Speech? 12 Bus. L. REV. 15, 23 (1979) ("[I]f the ownership regards the
corporation's expenditures for free speech as wasteful, the corporation and its management is [sic]
subject to suit. With owners today desiring to show their muscle and exercise their rights, this
internal "gag" may prove to be most effective.").
246. Means, Preface to A. BERLE and G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY XXX (rev. ed. 1968).
247. Because corporate expenditures for political speech, if properly handled, do benefit the
corporation, any shareholder challenge to proper expenditures on the ground that they are ultra
vires should fail, although there are many cases on the books holding to the contrary. Mobile Gas
Co. v. Patterson, 293 Fed. 208, 226 (M.D. Ala. 1923) (campaign contributions); McConnell v.
Combination Min. & Mill. Co., 31 Mont. 563, 79 P. 248 (1905) (lobbying expenses).
248. It has been suggested that it isAbood and Street, not Belotti, that should be reconsidered
by the Supreme Court. Smith, supra note 106, at I 11.
249. M. NADEL, CORPORATIONS AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 39-40 (1976); S. PRAKSASH
SETHI, ADVOCACY ADVERTISING AND LARGE CORPORATIONS 292-93 (1977); Rubin, Advocacy,
Big Business, and Mass Media, in BIG BUSINESS AND THE MASS MEDIA 21-22 (B. Rubin ed.
1977); and Rembar, For Sale: Freedom of Speech, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1981, at 31 ("If you
and I are opponents, and I speak through a bullhorn while you speak through a kazoo, you have
no freedom of speech.").
250. See 435 U.S. at 765, in which Justice White provided statistics indicating that in a earlier
referendum in 1972, political committees funded largely by corporations had raised and spent
large amounts of money to defeat the proposed personal income tax in Massachusetts. Mere reference to amounts of money spent, however, does not properly gauge the effects of such spending.
In the 1976 referendum, the same question was defeated by the same margin despite the ban on
corporate political contributions invalidated in Bellolti. Id at 790 n.28.
It is well known that in no election, candidate or referendum, is the biggest spender a guaranteed winner. See C. GREENWALD, GROUP POWER: LOBBYING AND PUBLIC POLICY 159 (1977); A.
HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY 3, 12 (1968).
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evidence which has appeared has related primarily to the electoral process, 25 12an area where the Supreme Court has provided special treatment.

25

Focusing on political speech generally, and not specifically on the
electoral process, one can see strong reasons to conclude that corporate
domination or undue influence is not a likely result of the Supreme
Court's decision to extend first amendment protection to corporate
political speech. True, many corporations are rich and powerful.
However, our society is filled with sufficient countervailing interests to
prevent corporations from exercising the type of domination that critics
of free corporate political speech fear. Among the most significant
countervailing forces are the media, big labor, and the courts.
As long as the mass media do not fall under the control of an
imaginary monolith called "Big Business," it is impossible to conceive
that corporate political speech can ever become an overpoweringly
dominant force in American political discussion.2 5 3 With justification,
251. In an article co-authored by Senator Gary Hart, reference was made to studies by Professor John Shockley which indicated that in several referendum situations, public opinion shifted in
favor of the corporate point of view after corporation-supported groups entered the fray with large
budgets. Hart and Stone, CorporateSpending on State andLocal Referendums: First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 29 CASE W. REs. L. RIv. 808, 820-21 (1979). Even Hart and Stone
admit that "[aln accurate measure of the actual effect of corporate involvement on voters is very
likely impossible to obtain, and Shockley's study results could be due to a wide range of variables
unrelated to the effects of corporate engineering." Id
Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court recently relied on Shockley's studies in upholding
a municipal limitation on contributions in referendum elections. Citizens Against Rent Control v.
City of Berkeley, 27 Cal. 3d 819, 614 P.2d 742, 167 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1980). The dissent was less than
enthusiastic about the the Shockley study, stating:
Indeed the only empirical data that appear in the record are studies of spending on
statewide initiative campaigns in California during the period 1954-1974. The studies
conducted by a Sacramento research organization, reveal that in 28 statewide contests
the highest spenders won 14 times and lost 14 times. I must leave to the reader what that
arithmetic proves.
Id at 835-36, 614 P.2d at 752, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 94 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
There are even examples which indicate that the public reacts adversely to large, heavily
financed campaigns. Opponents of large corporate spenders, although greatly outmanned
financially can do quite well by attacking the motives of the big spender and utilizing a "Davidand-Goliath" argument. Rubin, Advocacy, Big Business, andMass Media, in BIG BuSINESs AND
THE MASS MEDIA 11 (B. Rubin ed. 1977) (citing example of a Maine referendum on banning
returnable bottles which passed although supporters spent only $24,000 and opponents spent
$400,000).
Another example of big spenders who lost to less well-to-do opponents can be found in a
1971 New York referendum on transit fares. R. WINTER-BERGEn, THE WASHINGTON PAY-OFF
313 (1972) ("The voters, in these obvious examples of monetary superiority, seemed to resent the
pressure and voted their preference"). There are even candidate campaign examples which indicate a voter backlash against big-spending candidates. Id
252. See notes 281-313 infra and accompanying text.
253. Thomas Jefferson once said that "[w]here the press is free, and every man able to read, all
is safe." Letter to CoL Charles Yancey, in 14 THE WRmINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 384 (Lips-
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American business executives have complained that the mass media's
coverage of business and industry is shallow, naive, and mediocre.25 4
More to the point, the coverage can fairly be characterized as largely
anti-business" in perspective.255 Chet Huntley once noted: "One general characteristic of the American press which seems inexplicable is
the basic antipathy towards business and industry which I believe exists
in our journalism. American business and industry, more than any
other sector in our society, finds it difficult to get its story told accu256
rately and fairly."
In fact, since World War II, "[t]here is hardly an industry or a
product that has not had to face up to severe criticism from the
press. '257 Sometimes, corporations cannot even purchase time to reply. 211 One need only watch CBS's "Sixty Minutes" on a regular basis
to realize that much of the corporate political speech to be presented in
the future will have to be used to respond to attacks initiated by the
259
mass media.

comb ed. 1904), quoted in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 260 (1976)
(White, J., concurring).
254. Cutlip, TheMediaandthe Corporation A MatterofPerceptionandPerformance,in BusiNESS AND THE MEDIA 138 (C. Aronoffed. 1979) ("Businessmen can justly quarrel with the superficiality of much of today's news coverage of the corporate and economic life of the nation");
Rubin,Advocac, Big Business, andMass Media, in BIG BUSINESS AND THE MASS MEDIA 21 (B.
Rubin ed. 1977).
255. The overall anti-business bias that characterizes the mass media is qualified somewhat by
business' influence of the media through canned editorials utilized by small newspapers and by
threats to withhold advertising expenditures, which occasionally influence the content of the news.
Green,How Business Sways the Media, in BUSINESS AND THE MEDIA 56-60 (C. Aronoffed. 1979).
256. Chet Huntley, Media Antipathy TowardBusiness, Wall St. J., Aug. 7, 1973, at 14, col. 3.
Examples supporting this statement are not hard to find. See, e.g., Efron, The Media and the
Omniscient Class, BUSINESS AND Tim MEDIA 14, 18 (highly critical analysis of television network
coverage of a California referendum on nuclear power and of media coverage of toxic materials);
Cutlip, The Media andthe Corporation"A MatterofPerceptionandPerformance,in BUSINESS AND
Tim MEDIA 139 (C. Aronoff ed. 1979):
In March, April and May back a few years, a Senate subcommittee held hearings
which were vital to the oil industry and the nation's oil import program. For seven days
the committee heard what a Texaco spokesman termed "anti-industry" witnesses. These
witnesses were extensively covered by the Post. After April 3, the pro-industry witnesses
were heard. Not a single line of their testimony was reported. The score for the Washington Post was: anti-industry days, 300 lines; pro-industry days, 0.
Id
257. Finn, The Media as Monitorof CorporateBehavior, in BuSINESS AND THE MEDIA 119-20
(C. Aronoffed. 1979). Finn traces the beginning of the modem media's tendency to view business
critically to Rachel Carson's SILENT SpaRNO and Ralph Nader's UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED.
258. Smith, CorporateAccess to the ElectronicMedia, in BIG BUSINESS AND THE MASS MEDIA 97 (B. Rubin ed. 1977).
259. A recent Mobil Corporation "advertorial" which appeared in the Sunday newspaper supplement Parade Magazine, March 29, 1981, at 26, col. 1 was clearly defensive in tone, and aimed
at rebutting media reports of the dangers of nuclear power ("[H]ysteria was spread by reports
looking for the worst 'what if' cases because 'fear is an upper... fear is news' ").
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Another influential countervailing force is big labor, which, one

may assume, will have views diametrically opposed to those of large
corporations on many important issues. Big labor can definitely raise
to prevent corpothe funds necessary to speak in a voice loud enough
260
issues.
these
about
discussion
of
domination
rate
Other groups that should be mentioned include "consumerists, en-

vironmentalists, women's liberation advocates, the civil rights movement, and other activist groups" whose "demands are being steadily

by federal and
translated into an unprecedented wave of intervention
261

state governments into the affairs of business."
Even the "anti-business" decisions of the state and federal courts

in recent years have been viewed as an indication of the inability of
corporations to muster any effective political influence.2 62

In addition to overlooking the powerful countervailing forces
which exist in the American political system, those who fear corporate
domination of political discussion have had a tendency to assume that

America's large corporations speak with a single, overpowering voice.
This is patently not the case. The political battle between the trucking

and railroad industries that gave rise to the Supreme Court's decision
in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc.263 is illustrative. Professor Jacoby has noted other examples:
At any given time, business corporationsare split on many
nationalissues; there does not appear to be a monolithic "business interest." Thus, petroleum companies have opposed lib260. See Crain, Do Corporations 91eld Great PoliticalPower? in THE ATTACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA 60-61 (M. Bruce Johnson ed. 1978).
In the electoral arena, labor political action committees spent almost three times as much as
all corporate committees in the congressional elections of 1976. Smith, supra note 106, at 46. In
the 1980 congressional elections, these proportions apparently were reversed, Wall St. J., Apr. 8,
1981, at 1, col. 3, but all political action committee spending, labor and corporate combined,
constituted only 22% of the $160 million spent in congressional races in 1978, Cohen, Congressional.DemocratsBeware-Here Come the CorporatePACs, 12 NAT. J. 1304 (1980), and only 1%
of the funds contributed to presidential aspirants in 1980. Lanouette, PAC Gifts to Presidential
CandidatesInclude Some PoliticalSurprises, 12 NAT. J. 1309 (1980).
261. SpecialReport,The CorporateImage: PR to the Rescue, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 22, 1979, at 47.
262. N. JACOBY, CORPORATE POWER AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 156 (1973). It would be
difficult to think of a better illustration of this point than the recent decision in Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 285 (1980),

allowing a products liability plaintiff to recover from a defendant which marketed a "substantial
market share" of the defective product (DES) without demonstrating that the particular defendant
marketed the particular items which injured plaintiff. For a fuller discussion of Sindell and like
cases, see Birnbaum, DES Concert-of-Action Theory: New Cases Bring New Confusion, Nat. L.J.
May 4, 1981, at 31; Note, Manufacturers' Liability Based on a Market Share Theory: Sindell v.
Abbott Laboratories, 16 TULSA L.J. 286 (1980).
263. See note 196 supra.
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eral oil import quotas, while petrochemical companies have
favored them in order to obtain less expensive feedstocks;
steel companies have sought restraints upon imports of foreign steel, whereas automobile companies and other large
users of steel have fought them; and even with respect to such
matters as labor union legislation or anti-pollution regulations, businessmen are far from presenting a united front because firms in some industries are much more deeply affected
than those in others industries. 2 "
Such conflicts also exist on an intra-industry basis, 26 and even
within a single large corporation in the case of conglomerates.266 The
Bellotti opinion itself noted that closely held corporations might well
differ from publicly held corporations, and small public corporations
from large ones, on the issue of personal income taxation.267
In addition to these countervailing forces and their own divided
nature, corporations must overcome an even greater stumbling block to
effective political speech-the antipathy of the American public for big
business. At least some public support for corporations is necessary for
them to function effectively, 268 and in recent years that support has
been waning.2 69 In the face of the overwhelming public distrust of
large corporations, the corporate message, to have any effect, must
overcome the American public's natural fear and loathing of large,
powerful entities, 1 and skeptical views of the intentions and motives
of the corporate source.2 72
Mobil Corporation's "advertorial" campaign has been criticized as
264. JACOBY, supra note 265, at 155 (emphasis in original). See also Crain, Do Corporations
Wield Great PoliticalPower? in THE ATTACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA 61-62 (M. Johnson ed.
1978); S. PRAKASH SETHI, ADVOCACY ADVERTISING AND LARGE CORPORATIONS 290-91 (1977).
265. See EPSTEIN, supra note 28, at 172; Ellis, The Medik Business FriendorFoe? in BUSINESS

AND THE MEDIA 91 (C. Aronoff ed. 1979).
266. EPSTEIN, supra note 28, at 172-73 (subsidiary divisions of DuPont took different positions
on renewal of the Reciprocal Trade Act in early 1950's).

267. 435 U.S. at 785 n.22.
268. L. GOLDEN, ONLY BY PUBLIC CONSENT 3-4 (1969).

269. JACOBY, supra note 265, at 17, 153-154 ("As the 1970's began, the relatise political influence of the corporate business was probably less than it had been since the dark years of the Great
Depression ... ").
270. See Posner, Power in America-The Role of the Large Corporation,in LARGE CORPORATIONS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 103 (J. Weston ed. 1974). See also I. KRiSTOI, Two CHEERS FOR

CAPITALIsM 112-13 (1978) ("In any democracy, large and powerful organizations which are in
business to make a profit will inevitably be regarded-and always have been regarded-with distaste and suspicion."); Aronoff, Introduction to BUSINESS AND THE MEDIA xii (C. Aronoff ed.
1979).
271. J. GLOVER, THE REVOLUTIONARY COR'ORATIONS 427 (1980).

272. Efron, The Media andthe Omniscient Class, in BUSINESS AND THE MEDIA 25 (C. Aronoff
ed. 1979) ("Business will continue to be the symbolic scapegoat for all ills in this society."); H.
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ineffective because it speaks only to the "converted. 2 73 Professor
George Lodge of the Harvard Business School has stated that "[it is
naive on the part of Mobil to think that readers will believe a paid
viradvertisement by an oil company self-righteously proclaiming its
' z74
tues and hurling blame on those who dare to differ with them.
Readers know which newspaper and television advertisements
have been paid for by the large corporations, and are much more likely
to listen to the editorial views of the medium itself than those of large
corporations which have purchased ads in the same issue or show. No
matter how much money is spent, corporations will never be able to
manipulate public opinion at will. 2 75 Nor is there even any indication
that corporate executives have the slightest desire to dominate political
discussion in America, even if they could. 7 6
The proof is in the pudding. Bellotti and ConsolidatedEdison

have not opened the floodgates to corporate political speech. Mobil
Corporation's enthusiastically financed "Op-ed" advertorial campaign
has not pushed other voices off the editorial pages of the large newspapers of our country. Corporations have been engaged in political activity in America for almost 200 years, and in the use of the mass media
for over 60 years; yet no domination such as that feared by critics of
corporate political speech has occurred. Certainly the pendulum
swings to and fro; in some decades corporations will have more influence than in others, but Adolph Berle has pointed out:
• . . the fact was, and is, that centralization of industrial economic power to a point where it could dominate the political
state has been avoided in the American political system. It is
OLECK, MODERN CORPORATION LAW § 9 at 29 (Student ed. 1960) ("mhe average American...
").
has viewed the corporation with misgivings, often with downright antagonism ....
273. SpecialfReport, The CorporateImage: PR to the Rescue, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 22, 1979, at 54,
quoting Mr. Velmans, of the advertising agency Hill & Knowlton.
274. S. PRAKASH SETHI, ADVOCACY ADVERTISING AND LARGE CORPORATIONS 292 (1977).
275. R. TEDLOW, KEEPING THE CORPORATE IMAGE: PUBLIC RELATIONS AND BUSINESS,
1900-1950, at 208 (1979).
276. EPSTEIN, supra note 28, at 176 ("IT]here has been virtually no evidence in the statements
and activities of business managers that such a corporate political takeover is either contemplated
or desired.").
It is at least arguable that the traditional problem has been not too much corporate speech,
but too little. D. MOORE, POLITICS AND THE CORPORATE CHIEF EXECUTIVE 1 (1980). John
deButts, former Chairman of AT&T once said:
What we need is more open, frank discussion between media and government and business. John Chancellor told me once "if we've got a controversial subject to put on the
air, I can make one telephone call and get a consumerist. I can make one more call and
get a labor leader, and I can make a half a dozen and not get a single businessman who is
willing to come in here."
R. LA~m, W. ARMSTRONG, and K. MORIGI, BUSINESS, MEDIA AND THE LAW ix (1980).
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not at present a major threat. .

. Dominance by them over

the 7political
state in major matters is not a present possibil7
2

ity.

In summary, despite decades of corporate political speech, there
has been no sign that the corporate voice has tended to dominate the
first amendment's marketplace of ideas, and there is no sign today that
the Supreme Court's decisions in Belotli and ConsolidatedEdison will
alter the present situation. For the myriad of reasons just discussed, the
prospects for undue corporate influence on political discussion generally seem slim.
3. Election Reform Legislation
The aspect of Belloti that has drawn the most attention from commentators is its potential adverse impact on electoral reform legislation,
particularly the Federal Corrupt Practices Act,2 78 as now embodied in
the Federal Election Campaign Amendments of 1976,279 found at 2
U.S.C. § 441b. This concern is understandable because corporate
abuses of the electoral process, from Nicholas Biddle to Jay Gould to
Nixon and the Milk Fund, have been well documented.28 0 Nonetheless, the supposed adverse impact of Bellolti on the ability of local,
state, and federal governments to control corporate corruption and undue influence has been overestimated.281
As a starting point, the actual effectiveness of present legislation is
open to serious question. One may ask whether local and state officials
are strongly motivated to prosecute corporate violators of election laws
277. A. BERLE, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REPUBLIC 13 (1963).

Parallel conclusions have been drawn by EPSTEIN, supra note 28, at 229 ("[D]espite the impressive array of political assets, corporate political power does not constitute a threat to democracy in the United States."), and JACOBY, supra note 265, at 156-57 ("7he notion that corporate
enterprse 'dominates'orunduly influences the.4mericangovernment simply does not withstandexamination.") (emphasis in original).

278. Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420,34 Stat 864, later repealed by Federal Corrupt Practices Act
of 1925, tit. III, § 318, 43 Stat. 1074.
279. Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit. MI, § 321, 90 Stat. 490 (1976).
280. Some of these abuses are noted in Federal Election Comm'n v. Weinstein, 462 F. Supp.
243, 249 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
Other discussions appear in Cox, supra note 3, at 57, 65; Lambert, CorporatePoliticalSpend.
ing and Capaign Finance, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1033, 1034-40 (1965); Comment, First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti: CorporatePoliticalSpeech in Ballot-Measure Campaigns, 8 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE, 63, 73 (1978-1979); Comment, 13 SUFFOLK L. REv. 124, 135 (1979).
281. The very fact that the federal government and most of the states have on the books laws

tightly controlling corporate participation in the electoral process indicates that corporations do
not dominate the political process in America.
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given the possibility that targeted corporations might relocate.2"2
The effectiveness of federal legislation is also suspect. That legislation requires corporations to do most of their political activity
through political action committees (PACs).2 83 After a thorough analysis, however, one author recently concluded that the present structure
of federal regulation actually enhances the corporate voice by allowing
it to control and focus individual contributions:
Perhaps most bizarre, however, is the overall economic
effect of this system. While the Act limits the amount of
financial resources that corporations may direct to partisan
political activity, it also provides a means by which corporations may control the flow of individual campaign contributions. A corporation is prohibited from contributing to
political campaigns directly. It is permitted, however, to
devote unlimited resources in the form of in-kind contributions to obtaining from shareholders and employees, through
PAC solicitations, funds that management may then earmark
for the candidates of its choice. Assuming there are limits on
the amount of money that individual voters are willing to
devote to political campaigning, contributions to PAC funds
represent money that might otherwise be contributed to candidates directly by individuals. Thus, a PAC may operate to
concentrate campaign contributions under the control of corporate management, a perverse effect if decentralizing
financial political influence is a goal.284
282. Wallace and Stamps, Corporate Free Speech and Campaign Finance in Mississiopi, 49
Miss. L.J. 819, 825 (1978). The authors note that cases in which corporations have been found not
guilty of violating state corrupt practices acts outnumber those in which the corporation was
found guilty. Id at n.43.
283. Vandergrift, The Corporate Political Action Committee, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 422, 425-26

(1980):
The prohibition against corporate financial participation in federal political campaigns is contained in 2 U.S.C. § 441b. In essence, section 441b states that no corporate
treasury money may be spent on a federal election.
Qualifying this broad prohibition, section 441b exempts three categories of corporate disbursements from its definition of contributions or expenditures. These statutory
exemptions cover money spent for (I) "communications" directed at shareholders, executive and administrative personnel, and the families of each group, (2) nonpartisan voter
registration and get-out-the-vote activity directed at shareholders and executive and administrative personnel, and finally, (3) setting up, running, and soliciting contributions to
a "separate segregated fund," the statutory name for a PAC.
Id
For a detailed discussion of the solicitation rights of organizations under § 441b and pertinent
regulations, see Bread Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 635 F.2d 621, 626-27
(7th Cir. 1980).
284. Vandergrift. The Corporate Political 4ction Committee, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 422, 470

(1980).
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In addition to the fact that elimination of present state and federal
corrupt-practices acts might not lead to a significant increase in corporate political influence, a second reason exists why Bellotti is not likely
to alter the present balance of political power. Bellotti simply did not
abolish such legislation on a wholesale basis. The Supreme Court explicitly refused to say there could never be a valid limitation on corporate electoral spending that did not apply to individuals. 285 Although
Bellotti rejected the argument that a ban on corporate referendum
spending was needed to avoid undue corporate influence, it did so in
the face of an inadequate record. It is important to remember that BelJotti was not formally tried but was decided on the basis of stipulated
facts.28 6 The Supreme Court's majority specifically entered the caveat
that a different result might be mandated f legislative findings were
presented indicating "that corporate advocacy threatened imminently
to undermine democratic processes, thereby denigrating rather than
serving First Amendment interests. 28 7 Thus, the Supreme Court left
open the possibility that legislative action based upon substantial factual findings, rather than upon speculation, could be sustained.
Recently, in Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 88
the California Supreme Court held that even in referendum elections a
ban on contributions, as distinguished from a ban on expenditures
(Buckley v. Valeo), could be sustained as constitutional. The court felt
that there was evidence showing a causal relationship between voter
apathy and large campaign contributions, 28 9 and held that a limitation,
rather than a complete ban on contributions, served the compelling
state interest of combatting voter apathy. 9 0
Outside of the referendum setting, concern has been expressed
The same basic conclusion is reached by Nicholson, The Constitutionalityofthe FederalRestrictionson Corporateand Union Campaign Contributions andExpenditures, 65 CORNELL L. REv.
943, 993-94 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Nicholson]; and Darr and Tift, Campaign FinanceReform
FailsinEssentialMission, Legal Times of Wash., Apr. 20, 1981, at 8, col. 1.
However, it is clear that federal regulations have to some extent inhibited corporate political
activity. See Budde, Business PoliticalAction Committees, in PARTIES, INTEREST GROuPS AND
CAMPAIGN FiNANcE LAWS 14 (M. Malbin ed. 1980) (FECA regulations hinder trade-association
PACs); Glen, How to Get Around the Campaign Spending Limitations, 11 NAT. J. 1044 (1979)
('Procedural obstacles have been one reason for the relative dearth of independent spending efforts.").
285. 435 U.S. at 777 n.13.
286. Kiley, supra note 183, at 430. Mr. Kiley represented the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and its officers in Bellotti.

287. 435 U.S. at 789.
288. 27 Cal. 3d 819, 614 P.2d 742, 167 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1980).
289. Id at 828, 614 P.2d at 747, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
290. Id at 829, 614 P.2d at 748, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 90. A strong dissent by Justice Richardson
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about the impact of Bellotl on state and federal bans on corporate con-

tributions and expenditures in candidate elections, with particular attention paid to the federal ban in section 441b of title 2 of the United
States Code. Read together, Buckley v. Valeo 29 1 and Bellotti might logically indicate the imminent demise of section 441b.2 92 In fact, Justice
White's Bellotti dissent felt that the majority opinion merely postponed

the "formal interment" of the Act. 293 But Professor Cox has expressed
doubt that the Supreme Court would eviscerate such laws, deeming it

"unlikely that the Court will pursue the logic so rigidly as to hold section 441b unconstitutional." 294 Justice Powell's majority opinion in
Bellotti indicated as much:

The overriding concern behind the enactment of statutes
such as the Federal Corrupt Practices Act was the problem of

corruption of elected representatives through the creation of
political debts. ... The importance of the governmental in-

terest in preventing this occurrence has never been doubted.
The case before us presents no comparable problem, and our

consideration of a corporation's right to speak on issues of
general public interest implies no comparable right in the

quite different context of participation in a national political
campaign for election to public office. Congress might well be

able to demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or apparent corruption in independent expenditures by corporations to
influence candidate elections.2 95

The key to predicting the exact impact of Bellott lies in an analysis of the interplay between it and Buckley. In Buckley, the Supreme

Court upheld a federal statutory limitation on contributions to candidates' campaigns,2 96 but invalidated a limitation on individual political
pointed out that the evidence relied upon by the majority did not exist anywhere in the record, Id
at 93, and concluded that the law in question was not consistent with Buckley and Bellout.
The majority's position ignores evidence from a 1978 Harvard University study which concluded: "The most competitive elections, where voters have the most information about candidates, are those in which the most money is spent. Election contests in which spending is
comparatively high are also those in which voting participation tends to be the highest." Chapman, An Expensive Hobby, NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 6 & 13, 1980, at 15.

291. 424 U.S. 1 (1975).
292. Cox, supra note 3, at 68.
293. 435 U.S. at 821.
294. Cox, supra note 3, at 68. Professor Cox bases his prediction not only on the majority's
express reservation, but also upon Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Pipefitters Local 562 v.
United States, 407 U.S. 385, 443 (1972), which assumed the constitutionality of § 441b and accepted the argument that serious dangers result from "major participation in politics by the largest
aggregations of economic power, the great unions and corporations."
295. 435 U.S. at 788 n.26 (citations omitted).
296. 424 U.S. at 16-19.
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expenditures made independently of a specific candidate's control.297
Thus, the implications of Bellotti for corporate candidate contributions
and for corporate independent expenditures must be examined separately.
Regarding campaign contributions to candidates, reasonable limitations on corporate spending should continue to be allowed. 298 So
long as limits on contributions by individuals remain intact, limitations
for corporations probably will also. In fact, limitations for corporations
might permissibly be more stringent in the contribution area. Buckley
seemed to indicate that little true expression is involved in candidate
contributions.2 9 9 Certainly there seems to be little informational value
to a contribution which is merely turned over to the candidate to be
spent at the candidate's direction.3" A communication without informational value to the recipient is without first amendment
protection
3
under the rationale of Belloi and ConsolidatedEdison . 01
More importantly, the risk of creating political "debts" which allegedly exists in contributions to specific candidates, but not in referendum elections, could be found by the Supreme Court to be a
compelling state interest justifying the ban on corporate contributions.3 0 2 As noted above, Justice Powell's majority opinion in Bellotti
suggested this distinction. The lower courts have been virtually unanimous in accepting the risk of creating political debts which could lead
to corruption or the appearance of corruption as a compelling state interest, and in distinguishing
between referendum and candidate elec30 3
tions on that basis.
297. Id at 20-21.
298. See Nicholson, supra note 284, at 948.
299. 424 U.S. at 20-21.

300. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Weinstein, 462 F. Supp. 243, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(corporate financial contributions "say little"). See also Birnbaum, The Constitutionalityof the
FederalCorruptPracticesAct After First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 28 Am. U.L. Rav.

149, 171 (1979).
301. In Federal Election Comm'n v. Lance, 635 F.2d 1132, 1141 (5th Cir. 1981), a case involv-

ing former Presidential adviser Bert Lance, the court held that "the overdrafts made to the Lance
out of the ordinary course of business has no speech elements at all" and therefore were not
protected by the first amendment.
302. Mayton, Politics,Money, Coercion,andthe Problem with CorporatePACs, 29 EMoRY L.J.

375, 389 (1980); Kiley, supra note 183, at 439.
303. Bread Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 635 F.2d 621, 629 (7th Cir.

1980) (upholding § 441b's limitation on solicitation by trade associations); Let's Help Florida v.
McCrary, 621 F.2d 195, 199-200 (5th Cir. 1980) (invalidating Florida statute's limitation on contributions to political committees in issue election); C&C Plywood Corp. v. Hanson, 583 F.2d 421,
425 (10th Cir. 1978) (invalidating Montana ban on corporate contributions in referendum elections); Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d 844, 852-53 (2d Cir. 1973) (pre-Bellotti case making candi-

date/referendum distinction); Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 501
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Turning to a limitation on independent political expenditures by

corporations, it seems less likely that a first amendment challenge could
be wholly survived in light of the combined impact of Bellotti and

Buckley. It is true that in footnote 26, the Bellotti opinion left the door
open for Congress to document the danger of real or apparent corrup-

tion stemming from independent political expenditures.

Some

courts30 4 and commentators 3 5 have indicated that the aggregate wealth

of a corporation and the manner in which corporate managers can mobilize employees 3 6 make independent corporate activities more likely
to lead to corruption than those of even very wealthy individuals. Even

if not directed by a candidate, a corporate expenditure to support the
candidate could create a debt which would give rise to the appearance

of corruption.
However, because of the informational value of independent expenditures as recognized in Buckley,30 7 it is strongly arguable that even
corporate independent expenditures should be protected in light of Belloti. However, nothing in Bellotti would prevent the federal govern-

ment or the states and localities from using stringent disclosure
requirements to ensure that the potential voter knows the source of the

political message received.308 Such a disclosure requirement could provide a very effective guard against corrupting actions by corporaF. Supp. 422, 438 (D.D.C. 1980) (upholding § 441b's restrictions on solicitation by non-stock corporations to members); Federal Election Comm'n v. Weinstein, 462 F. Supp. 243, 247 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (upholding conviction of corporate governmental contractor for making campaign contributions in violation of § 441b).
304. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Weinstein, 462 F. Supp. 243, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
305. See Nicholson, supra note 284, at 992-93.
306. Wallace and Stamps, CorporateFree Speech and Campaign Finance in Mississiopi, 49
Miss. L.J. 819, 831 (1978).
307. See Birnbaum, The Constitutionalityofthe FederalCorruptPracticesAct After First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 28 AM. U.L. REV. 149, 172-73 (1979):
[When a corporation gives money to a third party in order to publish an advertisement
containing reasons why a particular candidate should be supported, that corporation is
communicating political ideas to the reader of those advertisements. Hence, although
expenditures are used like contributions to express the speaker's support of a candidate,
expenditures also serve as a vehicle for transmitting political information to the public at
large.
id
308. Indeed, in Bellotti, Justice Powell emphasized:
Corporate advertising, unlike some other methods of participation in political campaigns, is likely to be highly visible. Identification of the source of advertising may be
required as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected. In addition, we emphasized in Buckley the
prophylactic effect of requiring that the source of communication be disclosed.
435 U.S. at 792 n.32 (citations omitted).
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tions.3 °9 True corruption, of course, would always be illegal and
punishable under the law.
The main point to be made is that Belloii has not ruled out limited regulation of corporate spending and participation in the electoral
process.3 10 The Supreme Court has left open, upon a proper showing,
the possibility of significant restraints on both candidate contributions
and independent political spending. But at the same time, Bellotti, and
now ConsolidatedEdison,recognize that any corporate political activity
which has informational value should not be denied to potential public
recipients upon the grounds of mere speculation. The Supreme Court
has not closed its eyes to potential corporate abuses, especially the risk
of corporate abuse of the electoral machinery. But the Court has required that regulations be based on fact, not fancy.
VI.

THE ALTERNATIVE:

GOVERNMENT CENSORING

The potential dangers of corporate political speech just discussed
are not imaginary; they are real. They have been exaggerated, but they
do exist. It must be remembered, however, that similar dangers arise
309. Hart and Stone, Corporate Spending on State and Local Referendums: First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 29 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 808, 823 (1979); Tucker, Use of Corporate
FundsforPoliticalSpeech, 53 CONN. BJ. 185, 202 (1979).
Some have had reservations about the effectiveness ofdisclosure requirements. D. ADAMANY
& G. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY: A STRATEGY FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN AMERICA 113-15

(1975). But the American electorate's increasing sophistication is a factor which cannot be discounted in weighing the potential effectiveness of such requirements. Chapman, An Expensihe
Hobby, NEw REPuBLIc, Sept. 6 & 13, 1980, at 14.

310. After an exhaustive analysis, Nicholson, supra note 284, at 1009-10, concluded:
There is much that Congress can still do within the contraints of Buckley, Bellotti, Mosley and Consolidated. Public funding of congressional campaigns is one possible solution. Others include substantially lowering the present $5,000 contribution limitation,
and limiting the amount candidates can receive from business and labor PACs. These
solutions, however, will channel special interest funds into corruption-generating "independent expenditures." Such reforms, therefore, should be accompanied by limitations on independent expenditures set at a level that permits corporate and labor views to
enter the marketplace of ideas without creating an incentive for corruption. A balance
must be struck, albeit a precarious one, between the interests of hearers in having access
to corporate and labor views and the interest of the electorate in being governed by
representatives who are not indebted to special interests.
Id
Additionally, Professor Mayton has recently built a strong argument for the necessity for and
constitutionality of revision of the FECA to prevent corporate PACs from soliciting contributions
from vulnerable junior executives who, unlike the shareholders, are in the position of the union
members in the Abood and Street cases. This reform, Mayton argues, would discourage incumbent politicians from coercing contributions from corporations and would ensure that labor PACs
and corporate PACs are evenly balanced. Mayton, Politics,Money, Coercion,andtheProblem with
Corporate P.ACs, 29 EMORY L.J. 375, 384-92 (1980). If Mayton is correct, this single reform could
largely alleviate the bulk of the concerns critics have voiced about the potential undue influence of
corporate PACs in the electoral setting.
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from virtually every kind of speech. Government control of all speech
to avoid these dangers is an option. Fortunately, the framers of the first
amendment elected to run these risks.
Bellotti and ConsolidatedEdison, unfortunately, do not adequately
discuss the alternative to their holdings. That alternative is the evaluation of speech by the government rather than by the people. Even Justice White's vigorous dissent in Bellotti did not seriously propose that
the government should undertake to strike the proper balance of political views to which the public is to be exposed, 3 ' yet that is the alternative implicitly suggested by his position.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court came down strongly against such
government tinkering with free speech when, in Buckley, it said:
[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment,
which was designed "to secure the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources"
and "to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringof political and social change desired by the peoing about
3 12
ple."
Even if the government were to undertake this risky task, there
could be no assurance that suppression of one group's voices would
truly enhance the voices of an opposing group. The Supreme Court's
decisions in Buckley and Bellotti clearly evince a reluctance to allow
such tinkering.3? 1 3 This reluctance is well founded.
The problems arising from governmental interference with free
speech may be clearly seen in the area of commercial speech. As Professor Rotunda has demonstrated persuasively, open regulation of corporate activity allows the people, through their representatives, to judge
the pros and cons of government regulation of business. However,
where legislatures attempt to suppress corporate activity indirectly
through suppression of commercial speech, the costs of the regulation,
and the government's true motives, are hidden from the people:
The public's insight into legislative decision-making suffers when legislators regulate truthful speech. Because of the
311. See Comment, supra note 187, at 647.
312. 424 U.S. at 48-49 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266, 269

(1964), quoting in turn Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) and Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).

313. Note, 20 B.C. L. REv. 1003, 1023 (1979).
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hidden burdens inherent in any regulation of speech, the legislature, at best, may not perceive the full consequences of its
regulation. At worst, the legislature, by disguising its true
objectives, may implement a policy that the majority of people would oppose if they had received adequate information
about the true costs of the proposal. The legislature, in short,
may impose regulations that a majority of the people would
have rejected if they were cognizant of the regulation's true
burdens. Restrictions on advertising reflect an anti-democratic means of implementing other policy judgments. 14
The classic example of the hidden costs of government regulation
of commercial speech is the VirginiaPharmacy case in which, it may be
confidently surmised, the legislative motive behind the ban on pharmacy advertising was to provide a hidden subsidy to small, less efficient
pharmacies. 15
The same type of hidden motives pervades the suppression of corporate political speech. In Beiotti, for example, the legislation banning
corporate political speech regarding a state personal income tax referendum "fairly reeked with a motive to prevent speech with which the
legislators disagreed." 316 In ConsolidatedEdison , Justice Stevens accurately characterized the ban on inserts discussing the future development of nuclear energy as "motivated by nothing more than a desire to
3 17
curtail expression of a particular point of view. '
These bans on expression of a legitimate point of view, even if
advanced by a large corporation, cannot be reconciled with the inter314. Rotunda, The CommercialSpeechDoctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1080,
1081 (1976).
In this connection, it has been written:
The state cannot control commercial speech as an incident to its control over the
economic operations of a corporation. Economic regulation is presumptively valid because it arises from and is subject to correction by an unfettered political process. Because it restricts the flow of information by which the public becomes aware of, and acts
to change, legislation, regulation of expression cannot be similarly justified.
The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARv. L. Rnv. 74, 167 (1980).
These statements constitute an effective rebuttal to the dissents of Justices White and Rehnquist in Belotti in which it was argued that if the state can regulate the businesses of corporations
and public utilities, surely the state can regulate or even ban their speech as well.
315. Rotunda, The CommercialSpeechDoctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1080,
1098 (1976).
316. Neubome, A RationaleforProtectingandRegulating CommnercialSpeech, 46 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 437, 458 n.56 (1980). See also Comment, First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti: Corporate PoliticalSpeech in Ballot-Measure Campaigns, 8 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 63, 69
(1978-1979); Comment, From Dartmouth to Bellotti: The Political Careerof the American Business Cor.poration, 6 OHIo N.L. Rav. 392, 399-400 (1979).
317. 447 U.S. at 546.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol16/iss4/1

56

19811

Prentice: Consolidated Edison and Bellotti: First Amendment Protection of C
COOPOR.ATE POLITICAL SPEECH

ests underlying the first amendment.318 The true danger to freedom of
speech lies not with corporate domination but with legislative usurpation of the people's right to weigh all points of view toward the goal of
deciding for themselves which to accept or reject.
Even if one were to assume, in the face of rather strong evidence to
the contrary, that government officials are always well-intentioned in
their attempts to prohibit or regulate corporate political speech, attempting only to protect the public from its inability to cope with the
onslaught of various messages, such an action would seem unacceptably paternalistic. 319 As the Supreme Court said in Bellotti:
[Tihe people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments. They may consider, in making their
judgment, the source and credibility of the advocate. But if
there be any danger that the people cannot evaluate the information and arguments advanced by appellants, it is a danger
contemplated by the framers of the First Amendment.320
VII.

CONCLUSION

The statements made and conclusions reached in this article
should not be taken as an indication that the corporate political

message should be believed by the listening public. The point is only
that members of the American public should have the opportunity to
evaluate that message for themselves without the assistance of government censorship. Nor should this article be taken as a defense of the
activities of large American corporations. The distrust and apprehension many Americans feel toward large corporations is not unfounded.

Many corporations have been guilty of political misconduct and other
misdeeds, both here and abroad. Corporations have brought upon

themselves much of the public opprobrium to which they have been
318. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,254-58 (1974), a case involving

a state's attempt to force a newspaper to provide "equal space" to those political candidates it
opposed, the Supreme Court recognized the dangers of undue influence arising from the monop-

oly position of such a newspaper, but found the risk of government regulation of speech to be even
more serious.
319. The concern for the susceptibility of the American public to the corporate political

message overlooks the antipathy most American have for corporations. This anti-business outlook, discussed above at notes 271-275, is unlikely to change unless our society's most influential
image-builder, television, alters its depiction of businessmen. "From Dallas' oily antihero J.R.
Ewing on down, most businessmen on television are depicted as crooks, amoral wheeler-dealers,
criminals with Mafia connections, cheats, employers of professional arsonists and, worse still, jerks

clowns and buffoons." TiME, Apr. 27, 1981, at 51.
320. 435 U.S. at 791-92.
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recently subjected. However, these misdeeds do not justify government
attempts to limit the expression of an important, unique political
message. The people do not need to be protected from themselves, especially by government officials who tend to protect the people primarily from messages with which they themselves personally disagree.
Freedom of speech is one of America's most precious commodities, and
regulations which infringe upon that freedom, even if well-intentioned,
should be carefully scrutinized.
It is therefore submitted that Consolidated Edison and Bellotti
were both correctly decided. Both involved heavy-handed governmental attempts to prevent the public from hearing messages on important
issues that the government did not wish to be heard. To uphold those
bans would have been a serious blow to the values underlying the first
amendment.
To deny corporations the right to speak on important political issues is to deny the American public the right to hear a potentially
unique point of view emanating from a knowledgeable source with the
resources to study and obtain information that might otherwise be unavailable. Bellotti and ConsolidatedEdison simply recognize the value
of all information to the operation of a democratic society. The value
of allowing the public to consider every point of view should not be
underestimated by those who disagree with the corporate message.
Neither Bellotti nor ConsolidatedEdison gives corporations the
same political speech rights accorded to individuals. Neither case renders impossible the reasonable limitation of corporate participation in
the electoral process. Bellotti clearly allows, and even invites, government regulation of corporate electoral activity when that regulation is
based upon solid evidence that the target activity would lead to corruption or the appearance of it.
What these two opinions do, to their credit, is recognize and emphasize the value of the free interchange of ideas in a democratic society and the potential corporate contribution to that interchange. No
one's free speech rights are absolute. In virtually every free expression
case, the Supreme Court engages in a balancing process. Bellotti and
ConsolidatedEdisonensure that when the weighing process takes place
in future corporate speech cases, full recognition will be given to the
free expression interests served by corporate speech. And by their very
tone, Bellotti and ConsolidatedEdison demand that any potential suppression of corporate speech with potential value to the community of

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol16/iss4/1

58

1981]

Prentice: Consolidated Edison and Bellotti: First Amendment Protection of C

CORPORA TE POLITICAL SPEECH

657

ideas be strictly circumscribed and factually justified. In short, the
Supreme Court has directed that these words of Justice Douglas be
kept in mind:
Some may think that one group or another should not
express its views in an election because it is too powerful, because it advocates unpopular ideas, or because it has a record
of lawless action. But these are not justifications for withholding First Amendment rights from any group-labor or
corporate.3 21
The recognition of corporate political speech as a protected form
of expression is a positive development in first amendment law which
should be hailed, not feared.
321. United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 591 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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